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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(2)(h)(1988).
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated December
7, 1988.

A copy of said Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum

1.

-iii-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that the

December, 1985 trustee's sale was valid.
2.
attorney's

Whether

fees

and

the

costs

trial
of

court

erred

to

defendant

court

in

awarding

and

not

to

plaintiff, when plaintiff was the prevailing party in the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff,

Occidental

Nebraska

Federal

Savings

Bank

brought on action against defendants Daniel S. Mehr, Kathryn C.
Mehr, Daniel S. Mehr II, and Deborah L. Mehr seeking a deficiency
judgment

resulting

April of 1986.

from

a trustee's

sale which took place in

Defendants answered contending that a trustee's

sale which occurred

in December 1985 on the same property was

valid and therefore the April trustee's
Plaintiff
December,

argued

1985 trustee's

requirements

governing

complied

in

with

that

that,

sale was

as

a

matter

invalid

non-judicial
three

sale had no effect.

months

of

since the

foreclosures
did

not

law,

statutory
were

elapse

the

from

not
the

recording of an Amended Notice of Default before a Notice of Sale
was sent.

Therefore, the April, 1986 trustee's sale was valid

since the statutory mandates were complied with.
Defendants contended that the December, 1985 trustee's
sale

was

valid

since

the

statutory

requirements

for

judicial foreclosure were substantially complied with and

1

a non-

therefore the April, 1985 trustee's sale was invalid and did not
create a deficiency.
The case was tried before a jury with the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.

The parties stipulated to all the

facts except for the fair market value issue which was presented
to the jury.

After the jury returned with its decision as to

valuation, the Court held that the December 1985, trustee's sale
was valid

and

effect.

The

defendants

in the principle

December
attorneys

16,
fees

that

the April, 1986 trustee's sale was of no

Court

1985,
and

entered

a

deficiency

amount of

trustee's

sale.

judgment

against

$7,339.44 based
The

Court

costs to the defendants

also

in the

$4,451.98, to be offset against the judgment

on the
awarded

amount

of

in favor of the

plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts presented below were stipulated

to by the

parties at the beginning of the trial.
1.

On January 28, 1983, defendants obtained a loan

from Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corp. secured by a trust deed on
certain real property located in Uintah County, Utah.
was

subsequently

assigned

to

plaintiff.

The loan

(Plaintiff's

First

Amended Complaint paragraph 3, defendants answer paragraph 3 ) .
2.

Defendants fell behind in their obligation to pay

the debt and plaintiff, on July 26, 1985, caused to be recorded a
Notice of Default.

The July 26, 1985 Notice of Default omitted a

portion of the property to be foreclosed.
2

A copy of the Notice

of Default is attached as Exhibit

M

AM.

(See court transcript p.

4, lines 5-12).
3.
September

Thereafter,

9,

1985,

plaintiff

an Amended

caused

Notice

described the property to be sold.

of

to

be

recorded

Default

which

on

fully

(See court transcript p. 4,

lines 13-18).
4.
November
1985.

A Notice of Sale was mailed to the defendants on

13, 1985 scheduling a trustee's sale for December 16,

(See court transcript p. 4, lines 19-21).
5.

Less than three months had transpired

date the Amended

Notice of Default was recorded

since the

(September 9,

1985) and the Notice of Sale went out (November 13, 1985).
months had passed

since the recording

of the

Three

first Notice of

Default (July 26, 1985).
6.
and

the

only

$983,086.33.
7.
December

On December 16, 1985, a Trustee's Sale was held,
bid

entered

was

by

plaintiff

in the

amount

of

(See court transcript p. 4, lines 22-25).
Prior to the expiration of three months from the

16, 1985 trustee's sale, plaintiff filed a deficiency

action against the defendants.
8.

It was thereafter determined

by the

beneficiary

and the trustee that a defective procedure had occurred in the
foreclosure
Notice

of

process.
Sale

to

In March
be

sent

to

1986, plaintiff
the

defendants

then caused a
which

notice

indicated that a trustee's sale would take place on April 16,
1986.

(See court transcript p. 5, lines 1-10).
3

9.

On April 16, 1986, a trustee's sale was held and

the plaintiff, the only bidder, was the successful bidder with a
bid of $400,000.00.
10.

(See court transcript p. 5, lines 7-10).

Plaintiff

then amended

filed to reflect the April

the complaint

previously

1986 trustee's sale and

seeking a

deficiency judgment in the amount of $608,287.61.
11.

Defendants denied

liability

and argued

that the

first sale in December of 1985 was valid and that the April 1986
trustee's sale had no effect.
12.

The

trial

Court

held

that

the

December,

1985

trustee's sale was valid and that therefore the April, 1986 sale
was of no effect.

The Court then entered a deficiency judgment

against defendants, as of December 16, 1985, of $7,339.44 based
on the difference between the bid amount of $983,086.33 and the
debt of $970,425.77.

The Court also awarded attorney's fees and

costs to the defendants in the amount of $4,451.98, to be offset
against

the

judgment

in

favor

of

plaintiff.

(See

court

transcript p. 10, lines 6-14).
13.
Supreme

The

Court's

trial

decision

Court
of

based

its

ruling

Concepts, Inc. v.

Realty Serv.. 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).

on

First

the

Utah

Security

(See Court Transcript

p. 4, lines 1-4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff argues that the December 1985 trustee's sale was
invalid because the Notice of Sale was sent out before three
months had passed

from the recording of the Amended Notice of
4

Default as required by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967).

The trial

court improperly granted costs and attorney's fees to defendant
since plaintiff was the prevailing party and was thus entitled to
its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32
(1985).
The trial court's ruling was made as a "matter of law"
and

the

appellate

court,

in

its

review,

need

not

give

any

deference to the lower court's decision but should review the
decision to determine if, based on the stipulated facts, it was
correct as a matter of law.

City of West Jordan v. Utah State

Retirement Bd.. 767 P.2d 530, 98 UAR 37, 38 (Utah 1988).
I.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DECEMBER 1985 TRUSTEE'S SALE IS INVALID SINCE
THREE MONTH DID NOT ELAPSE FROM THE RECORDING OF
THE AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT TO THE DATE THE
NOTICE OF SALE WAS SENT OUT. CONTRARY TO THE
REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE ANN. $57-1-24 (1967).

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24

(1967), Sale of trust property by

trustee - Notice of Default, provides:
The power of sale herein conferred upon the
trustee shall not be exercised until:
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in
the office of the recorder of each county wherein
the trust property or some part or parcel thereof
is situated, a notice of default, identifying the
trust deed by stating the name of the trustor
named therein and giving the book and page where
the same is recorded or a description of the trust
property, and containing a statement that a breach
of an obligation for which the trust property was
conveyed as security has occurred, and setting
forth the nature of such breach and of his
election to sell or cause to be sold such property
to satisfy the obligation;

5

(b) not less than three months shall thereafter
elapse; and
(c) after the lapse of at least three months the
trustee shall give notice of sale as provided in
this act.
Emphasis added.
In this case a Notice of Default was recorded on July
26, 1985.

The July Notice of Default did not contain a complete

description of the property to be sold at the trustee's sale.

It

did not include Lots 21, 22 and 23 of Central Park, Plat A, a
proposed

subdivision.

To

correct

that

omission,

an

Notice of Default was recorded on September 9, 1985.

Amended

The Amended

Notice of Default provided, on page 2, that the defendants had
ninety (90) days from its recording date to cure the default.

As

stated, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967) requires three months to
expire after the recording of the notice of default before the
trustee can give notice of the trustee sale.
would have been December 9, 1985.

In this case that

However, in the present case,

the Notice of Sale was sent out on November 13, 1985 almost a
month

before

the

expiration

of

the

statutory

three

month

reinstatement period and clearly prior to the expiration of the
90 day cure period provided in the Amended Notice of Default.
The trustee's sale that then occurred

in December of 1985 was

invalid because the trustee cannot exercise the power of sale
conferred by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24
steps are complied with.

(1967) until the required

A noted commentator stated:

Institution
of
the
[private
foreclosure]
proceeding is governed by the terms of the mortgage
where no statue prevails; but where a statute
6

prescribes the method, that should be followed. If the
notice, and the advertising, do not comply with these
commands, the sale will be ineffective;....
G.

Glenn,

Glenn

on

Mortgages

§

107

(1943).

Since

the

requirements of the non-judicial foreclosure statute were not
complied with the December 1985 trustee's sale was ineffective.
The

trial

court

held

controlling in the present case.
holding

is

in

error.

The

that

Concepts,

centered

around

the

was

Plaintiff contends the Courtfs

facts

in

the

instant

significantly different from the facts in Concepts.
Concepts

supra

question

of

case are

The facts in

whether

or not a

typographical error in the published notice of sale with respect
to the year the sale was to occur was sufficiently irregular to
invalidate the sale.

The question in this case centers around

the question of whether or not the Amended Notice of Default had
any

impact

on the non-judicial

sale of

foreclosure

sale of

December 1985 and whether or not the scheduling of the December
1985 trustee's sale prior to the expiration of three months from
the

recording

date

of the Amended

Notice of Default was a

sufficient irregularity to invalidate the December 1985 trustee's
sale.
In Concepts the lender failed to file its deficiency
action within the three month period provided by Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-32 (1985).

Upon recognizing that failure, the lender in

Concepts then attempted to take advantage of the fact that the
published notice of sale contained a typographical error with
respect to in what year the sale was to take place even though
7

the notice of sale itself clearly indicated the correct year.
In the case at bar, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967)
clearly mandates that three months must expire before the Notice
of

Sale

can

be

sent

out.

There

can

be

no

dispute

that

requirement was not complied with if the three month period to
reinstate began upon the recording of the Amended Notice of
Default.

However, the trial Court in its decision, chose to

completely ignore the Amended Notice of Default.

No explanation

or reasoning was provided as to why the Amended Notice of Default
did not automatically give the defendants three months from the
date of its recording to cure the default.

Instead the trial

court held that the July 1985 Notice of Default was correct and
that three months expired from the date of its recording before
the Notice of Sale was sent out and therefore the December 1985
trustee's sale was valid.
Plaintiff

contends

such

reasoning

is

in

error.

Although plaintiff found no cases on point, in favor of either
side, as to what impact an amended notice of default has on a
reinstatement period, plaintiff contends that it is illogical and
a dangerous precedent to rule that a notice of default can be
arbitrarily ignored as it was in this case.
The

statutory

law

with

respect

to

non-judicial

foreclosures clearly provides that three months must expire from
the recording of the notice of default before a notice of sale
can be given.
Default

in

Thus, upon the recording of the Amended Notice of

September

of

1985

the
8

defendants

and

any other

interested third parties were automatically given three months
from the day of the recording to reinstate the loan.
otherwise

would

create

a

state

of

uncertainty

To hold

in the non-

judicial foreclosure process since it would be unclear when an
amended notice of default provided three months in which the
debtor can cure or whether or not such amended notice of default
had no impact on the already running three month period from the
recording of the first notice of default.

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-

24 (1967) unmistakenly provides that three months must expire
from the recording of the notice of default before a notice of
sale can be sent out.

Despite the language of that statute, the

trial court ruled, based on the holding in the Concepts case that
the foreclosure process leading to the December 1985 sale was
complied with.

As stated, however, the Concepts case should not

be controlling in this situation because of the wide difference
in the facts of the two cases.
Since the power of sale system reduces the prohibitive
costs of a judicial foreclosure and conserves judicial resources
by providing an expeditious non-judicial means of foreclosure, it
ultimately

benefits

transactions.

all

parties

involved

in

real

estate

Those parties all have a legitimate interest in

enforcing society's demands for strict compliance with power of
sale procedures.

Strict compliance with the requirements of a

trustee's sale preserves the integrity of the trustee's sale
process for all parties concerned with that system by reducing
the

need

for

judicial

supervision
9

of

the

process,

thereby

enhancing its use because of the savings in cost and time that
are inherent in a non-judicial process.

It is unjust to allow

the defendants to avoid liability for the debt which they freely
entered into.

They received their benefit of the bargain but the

plaintiff is being precluded from obtaining the benefits of the
bargain it entered into which is extremely unjust.
set aside in cases which reach unjust extremes.
at 1159 (Utah 1987).

Sales can be

Concepts, supra

In this case the December 1985 sale should

be determined to be invalid and the April sale valid.
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
DEFENDANT WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY.
The lower court erred in granting attorney fees and

costs to the defendants.

In actions dealing with trust deeds,

the

entitled

prevailing

party

is

reasonable attorney fees.
§57-1-32

(1985) states,

to

collect

its costs and

The last sentence of Utah Code Ann.
M

[i]n any action brought under this

section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect his
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action
under this section."
In this case, the Plaintiff sought relief under Utah Code
Ann. §57-1-32 (1985) and obtained judgment in its favor and is
thus the prevailing party.
$7,339.44

in

favor

The trial court found a deficiency of

of plaintiff.

A

"prevailing party" has

repeatedly been defined by courts in many jurisdictions as the
party

which

is predominant

in

a

law

suit

and

is

one who

successfully prosecutes the action even though not to the extent
10

of his original contention and is one in whose favor the decision
or verdict is rendered

and the judgment entered.

See Buza v.

Columbia Lumber Company, 395 P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska 1964); Travner
v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); Davson v. Shearer. 337 P.2d
46, 48 (Wash. 1959); City of Yakutut v. Rvman, 654 P.2d 785, 793
(Alaska 1982); Medhus v. Putter. 603 P.2d 669, 674 (Mont. 1979).
Merely because plaintiff did not recover all that it claimed
does not mean it did not prevail.

It received a judgment in its

favor and therefor has prevailed.

A prevailing party is a party

in whose favor the judgment or the verdict is to be entered.

See

Haven v. Amrine, 727 P.2d 533, 535 (Mont. 1986); State v. Alaska
Intern Air, Inc.. 562 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Alaska 1977); Moritzkv v.
Heberlein, 697 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Wash. App. 1985).

For example,

in Haven, supra at 535, the court defined prevailing party as
"the one who has an affirmative judgment rendered in his or her
favor

at

the conclusion

of* the entire case."

Plaintiff

has

obtained a verdict in its favor and is therefor the prevailing
party and is entitled to its costs and reasonable attorneys fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial
Notice
Amended

that the July

1985

of Default was appropriate and that the September

1985

Notice

reinstatement
trusteed sale.

of

Court erred

Default

period

in ruling

had

thereby

no

impact

validating

on
the

the

three

December

month
1985

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967) clearly provides

that three months must elapse from the recording of the notice of
default before notice of sale can be given.
11

There is no question

that the three month cure period did not elapse from the date of
recording of the Amended Notice of Default before the Notice of
Sale went out in November of 1985•
of the non-judicial

foreclosure

December 1985 trustee's sale.

This is clearly a violation

statute which

invalidates the

There is no basis or reasoning or

grounds to simply ignore the recording of the Amended Notice of
Default and treat it as if it had no impact on the foreclosure
process.

As such the Court should rule that the December 1985

trustee's sale was invalid and that the April 1986 was valid and
enter judgment accordingly.

Additionally, since a judgment was

entered in favor of the plaintiff, even though for a much less
amount than prayed

for, Plaintiff is still the prevailing the

party and is entitled to its attorney's fees pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1985).
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of April, 1989.
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN,
KESLER & SWINTON

s^

Glen W. Roberts
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this

day of April, 1989, I

caused to be hand delivered four volumes of a true and correct
copies of the foregoing, APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to the following:
Lynn S. Davis
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
50 South State, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C-86-1905
DANIEL S. MEHR, KATHRYN C.
MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II, and
DEBORAH L. MEHR,
Defendants.
In this matter, a trial by jury was held on February 2 and
3, 1988, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

At the conclusion

of the trial, the issue of valuation of the real property as of
December 16, 1985 and April 16, 1986 was submitted to the jury.
The Court determined that the question regarding the validity of
the December 16, 1985 sale was a legal issue and therefore did
not submit that issue to the jury.
On
found

February

that the

3,

1988, the

jury

returned

its findings and

fair market value of the real property, as of

December 16, 1985, was $425,000.00 and as of April 16, 1986 was
$375,000.00.

The Court held that the December 16, 1985 trustees

sale was valid and therefore the April 16, 1986 trustees sale was
of no effect.
amount

of

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the

indebtedness

owed

to

the

plaintiff

by

defendants,

including attorneys fees and costs, as of December 16, 1985 was
$970,425.77.

A bid

of $963,086.33

was made

by plaintiff and

accepted by the trustee and was then applied against the amount
owing

on

the

Note.

Thus,

a

deficiency

of

$7,339.44

as of

December 16, 1985 resulted and is payable by defendants to the
plaintiff.

The Court further awarded defendants their costs and

attorneys fees in the amount of $4,451.98.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1.

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANTS in favor

of plaintiff

for the amount of $7,338.94 which

represents the

aforementioned deficiency against defendants, plus interest from
December 16, 1985 through Ootoboa.JH>7

1988 at the Note default

rate of sixteen and one-half percent

(16.5%) per annum

amount

of $"$+£ A1,ftf, plus after accruing

interest

in the

at the Note

default rate/until paid in full.
2.
of

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AGAINST PLAINTIFF in favor

defendants

in

the

amount

of

$4,451.98

defendants1 attorneys fees and costs. u&^£
3.
plaintiff

c

which

t ^ ^ J ^ Z l

represents
.

c

$f^)rT~

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment amounts against
and

defendants

shall

be

augmented

in

the

amount of

reasonable costs and attorneys fees expended in collecting said
judgments by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit.
DATED this

n

1

day of gOtoubui, 1988.
BY /THE COUET.J
Judge Kenneth I^tgt^up

APPROVED AS TO FORM

Lynn S. Davies,
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the following Judgment, by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, on this ffi&l day of October, 1988,
to the following:
Lynn S. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
CSB Towers, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465

S a l t Lake City, Utah

84110

{HVfM-jh
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CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah corporation,
and Ray Pry, individually, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES,
INC., a Utah corporation, formerly
known as Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, a Utah corporation, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 20144.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 1, 1987.

Trustors under trust deeds executed
and delivered for development of real property brought action seeking declaratory
judgment that trustee's sale conducted under power of sale provision in trust deed
was valid, and that trustee was precluded
from, rescheduling second sale of same
property. The Third District Court, Summit County, Philip Fishier, J., held that
trustee's sale was void, and trustors appealed. The Supreme Court held that (1)
validity-of sale-was not affected by minor
typographical error in publication of notice
of foreclosure sale which stated that sale
would take place in previous year, and (2)
trustee's failure to bring deficiency action
within three months after sale* of property
terminated all of-trustors' remaining obligations.
Reversed.

1. Mortgages *»369(7)
Party who seeks to have trustee sale
set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or
fraud has burden of proving his contention,
it being presumed, in absence of evidence
to contrary, that sale was regular.
2. Mortgages *»369(2)
Defects in notice of foreclosure sale
that will authorize setting aside of sale
must be those that would have effect of
chilling bidding and causing inadequacy of

3. Mortgages *=»354
Notice of trustee's foreclosure sale
was not rendered invalid by fact that publication dated 1988 stated that sale would
take place in 1982. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-26.
4. Mortgages *»375
Trustee which purchased property b
foreclosure sale could not bring deficiency
action three months after sale, where validity of sale was not affected by minor typo*
graphical error in publication of notice of
foreclosure sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-25.
5. Mortgages «=»3e9<2, 3)
Sale once made will not be set aside
unless interests of debtor were sacrificed
or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing.
6. Mortgages *»335
Maker of deed of trust with power of
sale may condition exercise of power upon
such conditions as he may describe.
7. Mortgages ^*375
Once trust deed sale has been made,
trustee's exclusive remedy for deficiency is
to institute deficiency action within three
months of date of sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-128(2), 57-1-32.
B. Ray Zoll, Tom D. Branch, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
James Gilson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action, declaring a trustee's sale conducted under a
power of sale provision in a trust deed void
as a matter of law for failure to comply
with section 57-1-25 of the Utah Conveyances Act We reverse.
Plaintiffs were trustors under trust
deeds executed and delivered to defendant
for the development of real property into
the Park West Condominiums in Park City,
Utah. The amount of the loan exceeded
$3,000,000. When plaintiffs failed to per
form under the trust deed notes and loan
agreements, defendant filed a notice of de-
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fault. On September 14, 1983, plaintiffs
were served with a notice of sale to beheld
on October 28, 1983. In compliance with
statutory requirements, the notice was also
posted on the property to be sold and in
three public places in Summit County. Defendant also caused the notice to be published in the Salt Lake Tribune on October
3, 10, and 17 of 1983, as evidenced by an
affidavit of publication. The notice was
dated "This First Day of October 1983"
and stated that the property "mil be sold
... at the Summit County Courthouse ...
on October 28, 1982...." (Emphasis added.) Defendant-was the only .purchaser
and .bidder at the sale. Although neither
party has apprised this Court of the
amount of the bid, it is our understanding
that defendant bid an amount substantially
less than the outstanding balance due under the notes. The trustee passed'title*to
defendant by^ virtue**6f aHxustee's deed.
On April 2, 1984, and April 30, 1984,
plaintiffs were served with a ten-day summons advising them that an action had
been commenced to "recover deficiency due
under notes dated November 17, 1981, and
February 2, 1982." An affidavit in the
record indicates that plaintiffs' attorney refused to stipulate to the timeliness of the
action l and was informed by counsel for
defendant that a sale of the property would
be rescheduled because of the typographical error in the Salt Lake Tribune notice
misstating the year of the sale. This action ensued, with claims for declaratory
relief, injunction, and damages.
The parties stipulated that the facts were
not in dispute and that the solejegal issue
before the trial court-was the validity of
the sale on October.„28, 1983. Because
disposition of a case by summary judgment
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits,
we review the facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment-was-granted. Atlas
Corp. v. The Clovis National Bank, 737
P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). Where, as here,
summary judgment is granted as a matter
of law rather than fact, we are free to

reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Id.; Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah
1986).
[1,2] The purpfcse^f-strict notice requirement* in A nonjudicial aale of property
secured by trust deed is to inform persons
w^th~an interest 4n the property of the
pending sale of-that property, so that they
may act to protect^those interests. Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., Inc., 21 Wash.
App. 302, 584 P.2d 983 (1978). The objective of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of
the property. If that objective is attained,
immaterial errors and mistakes will not
affect the sufficiency of the notice or the
sale^jnade .pursuant thereto. Russell v.
Webster Springs National Bank, 164
W.Va. 708, 265 S.E.2d 762 (1980). A party
who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside
for irregularityrwant of notice, or fraud
has the"burden*>f proving his contention, it
being presumed, inJhe absence of evidence
to the contrary^that^the sale.was regular.
Id. Defects in -the -notice of foreclosure
sale that will authorize the setting aside of
the sale must be those that would have the
effect of chilling the bidding and causing
an inadequacy /of price. Boyce v. Hughes,
241 Ga. 357, 245 S.E.2d 308 (1978). The
remedy of setting aside the sale will be
applied^only in.cases which reach unjust
extremes. McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d
210 (Alaska 1978).
With these guidelines before us, we examine the case at hand. The parties do not
dispute the fact that the statutory notice
requirements were strictly observed, except that the notice by publication dated
October 1, 1983, stated that the sale would
take place on October 28, 1982. Errors like
these do not normally operate to vitiate a
foreclosure sale. Russell, supra (sale was
advertised for 10:00 a.m., EDT, on November 4, when on that date EST was in effect.
Held: no substantial departure from provisions .of trust deed or notice of sale as to
vitiate sale); Lovell v. Rov>an Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 46 N.C.App. 150, 264

1. Section £ k W 2 icrf.the XJtalfConveyances Act
requires aiuw^onitoii^ecover^the'-balancc due
upon the °M[gayffflJjff^&ch ^hesmatt-deed

was givenm&8BM&f$9Jbc„ commenced within
three monUtfatftesahe'aale of the property undcPBtnttt-ideed.-
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S.E.2d 743 (1980), rev'd on other grounds,
802 N.C. 160, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981) (notice
of foreclosure hearing was improperly given as S January 1978 when sent in December of 1978. H e l d ^ b y i o u s l y .inadvertent
error was not enough to invalidate proceedings); Hankins v. Administrator
of Veterans Affairs, 92 Nev. 578, 555 P.2d 483
(1976) (sale was erroneously advertised to
take place in North Las Vegas. Held:-proceedings jvere £ notJqvalidated asjplaintiffs
were^ot^ni%lj^J^-*mistake); Bailey v.
Pioneer Federal Savings and Loan Association, 210 Va. 558, 172 S.E.2d 730 (1970)
(first notice by publication left out place of
sale. Held:-substantial compliance with
the requirements of the trust deed was
sufficient, so long as 7 parties were not affectSdMn alfnatenal way); Holzman v.
Bristol County Savings Bank, 277 Mass.
383, 178 N.E. 622 (1931) (notice stated that
sale would be held June 9 "at 10 o'clock in
the forenoon." The year was left o u t
Held: no one was likely to be misled by the
omission from the notices in what year the
sale .-was t o take place). But, where the
erroneous date had the effect of not advertising the sale at all, the court held that
presumably no one was informed of the
actual date. Booker v. Federal
Land
Bank of New Orleans, 175 Miss. 281, 164
So. 877 (1936).
[3] The facts here are similar to those
in Russell, Lovell, and Holzman, The language of the notice by publication is in
futuro, advising the public that the sale
will be held at a future date. As such, it
can hardly be argued, nor does defendant
argue, that the notice confused bidders or
resulted in an undervaluation of the property. Defendant's at*tefnent that the incorrtet date'had the potential to mislead pro•pectiwbidders it insufficient to conclude
titetftin fact did.
14) Defendant received the trustee's
deed after the foreclosure sale of October
28,1988. Though the presumption of validity of sale is not conclusive and may be
rebutted, Houston First American
Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.1988),
section <67-l-£8(l) at the>Utah Conveyances
Act state 4hat**citto%irtrust&'s deed
avfliTinirniK>mp^ttnA^a*r**'*>,*a^l>*T>f*w*ir «**"Mi-*^

suchtCompliance-and^are^conchiSTve evidence in^favorof bona fide purchasers and
encumbrancers Jor^yalue and without notjpe. See also Triano v. First American
Title Insurance Co. of Arizona, 181 Ariz
581, 643 P.2d 26 (1982). Defendant does
not argue that it did not pay value, nor that
it had notice of any irregularities in the
foreclosure proceedings at the time of sale.
Nonetheless, defendant now argues that as
beneficiary under,the trust deed and purchaser at ,aale, Jt jvas -not -qualified as a
bona, fide purchaser, so AS to be entitled "to
rely on the recitals in-the deed he receives
from the trustee -sfter-the sale" (citing
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303
(Utah 1978)). Although .^e agree that defendant ^ a s ^ w t ^ ^ i u ^ i i d e purchaser,
that factxioes not change the result in this
case.
[5,6] Defendant's argument that the
flaw in the notice by publication invalidated
the sale to it perverts and uses as a sword
a statute that was meant to shield the
property rights of a trustor. A sale once
made will ;not be set aside unless the interests of^e<iebtor^wprt
sacrificed or there
was *ojpe-attendant f r a u d o r unfair dealing. McHue v. Church, 583 P.2d at 215,
216. The maker of the deed of trust with
power of sale may condition the exercise of
the power upon such conditions as he may
describe. Houston First American Savings, 650 S.W.2d at 768. Indeed, defendant
itself, in its memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment, as well u
in its argument before this Court, repeatedly concedes that the right to set aside s
trustee's sale is predicated upon the impairment of the trustor's rights to the property. MPublicatkm-omioea^pp(>tect^the debtor's intereat^and s ^ e ] ^ ensure the fairnets wof^the-aaie throughjcompetitive bxiding,^usz#ecuring-tijeyhigh^^p6M^W
prices"-(citing Comments, Validity of Power of Sale and Procedural
Considerations
in Its Exercise, 16 U.Kan.LRev. 611, 617
(1968)). The rea^Qj^or^trictj^
with
titfTOttttsHWfn*^^
o U ^ t | f ^ ^ ' : ( c i t i n g University Savings
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grantor of the power is entitled to have his
directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have it to take place
at the time and place, and by the person
appointed by him" (citing Houston First
American Savings, 650 S.W.2d at 768, and
quoting from Fuller v. O'Neal, 69 Tex.
349, 6 S.W. 181 (1887)). "The right of a
grantor of a deed of trust to have its
provision strictly complied with to effect a
valid foreclosure sale is absolute" (citing
Harwath v. Hudson, 654 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.
App.1983)). "Statutes making recitals in a
trustee's deed conclusive evidence of their
truth, may operate to deprive the trustor
(or those claiming under him) of property
without cfue process of faw, i.e., tfie opportunity for an individualized hearing" (citing
P. Basye, Clearing Land Titles § 43, at
168-69 (1983 Supp.)). (All emphases ours.)
[7] In short, there is nothing in defendant's argument that would persuade us to
adopt defendant's reasoning. The statutes
governing foreclosure sales under trust
deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs
up to the moment that the property was
sold and a trustee's deed issued. Thereafter, the trustee's deed operated to convey
to defendant, without right of redemption
by plaintiffs, title to the property of plaintiffs and all parties claiming under them.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2) (1986). Defendant thereafter had three months to institute action to recover any balance due on
the obligation for which the trust deeds
were given as security. Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-J-32. Once a trust deed sale has
been made, that remedy is the exclusive
remedy under statute. Cox v. Green, 696
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985).
We hold that the trustee's sale on October 28,*1988;*wa8~ properly advertised and
that the notice published in the Salt Lake
Tribune substantially complied with our
statutory requirements. Inasmuch as the
validity of the sale was not affected by the
minor typographical error, the trustee's
deed validly conveyed to defendant all of
plaintiffs' right, title, and interest in the
property, subject only to plaintiffs' continuing liability for any remaining deficiency.
Defendant's failure to bring a deficiency
o«4^« «rifVim thro* mnnthg after the sale of

the property terminated all of plaintiffs'
remaining obligations, and defendant's attempt aUrescheduling the same property
for a second sale ^as^improper as a matter
of 4aw.
The judgment is reversed.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
having disqualified himself, does not
participate herein.
| MY MUMMR SYSTIM>

TRUE-FLO MECHANICAL SYSTEMS,
INC., Plaintiff,
v.

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, Department of Employment Security, Defendant
No. 860281.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 9, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Oct 21, 1987.
Board of Review of Industrial Commission found that electrical contractor was
Successor for purposes of ch&rgwg predelessor's unpaid unemployment benefit
Costs to electrical contractor's account in
determining contractor's contribution rate.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that
(1) contractor "acquired" substantially all
ftssets of its predecessor for purposes of
charging predecessor's unpaid unemployment benefit costs to contractor's account,
even though contractor leased assets from
actual purchasers; (?) evidence that predecessor advised Department of Employment
Security to close its employer's account
following sale of its assets, together with
Evidence that predecessor filed wage report
tor last quarter showing no payroll, was
Sufficient to support finding of Board of
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Hted by designating that 4ts payment of more several obligors*." Finally/the majority**
$191,463.40 • be applied * on the principal construction reriders the statute useless. Jf an
amount of the judgment. A debtor or his obligor is able to specify the allocation of his
surety may direct application of his payment payment, section 15-4-3 serves no purpose*
1
as may be most advantageous to him. 60 Am.
All funds left after satisfying the joint debt
Jui. 2d Payment §§95, 130 (1987). Clay & should be allocated to Clay's several obligaCompany was '.severally liable for the full tion. Hence, interacting ^the joint debt
ainount of the judgment, and when Aetna as ($75,000) from the remaining funds paid on
surety paid the principal amount of the judg- the supersedeas bond ($140,175.03) leaves
ment and so designated its payment, it satis- $65,175.03. This amount may be credited to
fied the entire principal amount of the judg- Clay's several obligation (consisting of the
ment. Vater» Aetna recognized that it was also judgment amount of $191n463.40 minus the
jointly and severally liable for postjudgment joint debt of $75,000, or $116,463.40). Thus,
interest on $75,000 of the judgment. It there- after applying the bond first to interest, then
upon paid plaintiff an additional $25,097.30, to joint obligations, and then to several oblithereby fully discharging its obligation as a- gations, $51,288.37 of the original judgment
judgment debtor and as surety for John Clay remains to be satisfied. This amount, however,
& Company.
is part of the purely several obligation owedIf plaintiff is unable to recover the balance by Clay to Jorgensen. Aetna's duties as a
owing him because of the bankruptcy of John joint debtor were fulfilled and its obligations
Clay & Company, the blame must be assigned satisfied when the amount received by Jorgeto him for his failure to demand an adequate nsen on the supersedeas bond was, after allocation to accrued interest, divided according to
supersedeas bond.
section 15-4-3.
I would therefore reverse the trial court's
DURHAM, Justice: (Dissenting)
order holding Aetna liable to Jorgensen for
I dissent. The plain language of section 15- $60,337.68 plus interest owed after April 17,
4-3 governs the result in this case. Utah Code 1984.
Ann. §15-4-3 (1986) states:
The amount or value of anv
consideration received by the
obligee from one or more of several
Cite as
obligors, or from one or more of
98 Utah Adv. Rep. 37
joint or of joint and several obliIN THE SUPREME COURT
gors, in whole or in partial satisfaction of their obligations shall be
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H
credited to the extent of the amount
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, et al.,
received on the obligation of all coPlaintiffs and Appellants,
obligors, to whom the obligor or
v.
obligors giving the consideration did
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, et
not stand in the relation of a surety.
This statute governs the allocation of the at.,
Defendants and Appellees.
amount remaining from the supersedeas bond
after outstanding interest was paid. Clay, on
whose behalf the payment was made, gave to No. 20078
Jorgcnsen consideration which, according to FILED: December 30, 1988
the statute, "shall be credited ... on the obligation of all co-obligors/ §15-4-3. Thus, THIRD DISTRICT
the remaining $140,175.03 should first be Honorable David B. Dee
credited to Aetna and Clay's joint obligation ATTORNEYS:
of $75,000. Aetna's obligation as a joint
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for
debtor, and not as a surety, under the trial
appellants
court's judgment is therefore satisfied.
The majority opinion argues that the rem- Mark A. Madsen, Arthur H. Nielsen, and
Clark R. Nielsen, Salt Lake City, for
aining amount can be credited to Clay's sep- appellees
arate obligation before being credited to Aetna
and Clay's joint obligation. This result does
not fully account for the language found in ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
section 15-4-3. First, the statute operates
Plaintiffs city of West Jordan, the elected
when any consideration is received by a jud- mayor and members of the city council, five
gment debtor. Second, the statute clearly city employees, and two taxpaying ^city residcontemplates debts owed by* several, and -not ents/ (hereinafter!/West Jordan0.) ippeal from ,
^y.^olnt, v obligors j when If^includes ^pbnsideL
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defendant Utah State Retirement Board ("the
Board"). Th<e district court rejected a.variety
of constitutional challenges mounted by West
Jordan to portions .of Senate Bill 327, which
was passed by the 1983 legislature, and to
certain portions r of the underlying statutes
governing the state retirement system. These
challenges largely center around amendments
that S.B. 327 made to the various state retirement programs participated in by West
Jordan, amendments that expressly deny
municipalities participating in these programs
as of January 1, 1982, the right to withdraw
from membership in the system. We affirm.
In 1961, the Utah State Legislature created a
retirement system for all employees of the
state and its subdivisions. See 1961 Utah Laws
-chs.> 100-02. Political subdivisions of the
state were presumed to be members of the
system but were free to opt out of the plan. Id.
at § § 5 - 6 . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , West
Jordan's city council passed a resolution that
took. advantage of this option. However, in
1968 the city reversed itself and joined the
general state retirement system. In 1979, the
city also joined Utah's public safety retirement system and, at the same time, enlarged
its participation in and coverage under the
general state retirement system. The city relied
entirely on the state system to provide retirement benefits for its employees until December
of 1981, when the city obtained supplemental
Tetirement benefits for some of its employees
from Beneficial Life Insurance Company
^'Beneficial Life").. In June of 1982, the city
council voted to rescind the resolutions of
-1968 and 1979 requesting membership in the
state retirement system; West Jordan claimed
that the effect of this action was to withdraw
the city entirely from participation in the state
retirement system.
Senate Bill 327 was passed by the legislature
in 1983, apparently in response to attempts by
West Jordan and other political subdivisions
to withdraw from the system. It continued the
presumption that each political subdivision of
the state is a member of the system, but explicitly provided that any entity which was a
member as of January 1, 1982, cannot opt out
of the system and must continue to meet its
requirements. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 224, §11;
Utah Code Ann. §49-10-11(1), (2) (Supp.
1983) (now codified at Utah Code Ann.
§ § 4 9 - 2 - 2 0 4 , 49-3-204 (Supp. 1987)).
Any political subdivision that was not a
member as of January 1982 can elect to be
excluded from the system only if it does not
choose to provide any retirement benefits to
its employees. If it .chooses to provide benefits, it must do so through the state retirement
system!* 1983 Utah Laws ch. 224, §11; Utah
C o d e ' A n n . §49-10-11(2) v (Supp,.;. 1983)
(now; codified atlUtahl-Code :AnnT §$49-2£|
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Jordan filed the present action,^ seeking a
declaratory judgment that the provisions of
the bill and some of the provisions of the
underlying retirement system statutes violate
both the state and federal constitutions. The
trial court rejected these arguments in a
memorandum decision denying West Jordan's
motion for summary judgment. The trial court
then granted the Board's motion for summary
judgment, upholding the challenged provisions
of S.B. 327 and of the underlying retirement
system statutes. On appeal, West Jordan reasserts a number of the claims raised below.
Before reviewing these claims, we note that
the appeal before us presents questions of law
only. Therefore, we review the legal conclusions supporting the summary judgment for
correctness. E.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887
(1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985).
Underlying many of West Jordan's challenges to the constitutionality of S.B. 327 is the
claim that by denying members the right to
withdraw unilaterally from participation in the
retirement system, S.B. 327 alters system
members' rights and obligations. West
Jordan's premise is that it had the right to
withdraw at will from participation in the
system before the passage of S.B. 327. To the
extent that this premise is unsound, we need
not address arguments based on it.
When the city petitioned to join the state
retirement system in 1968, the statutes creating
that system were silent on the right of
members to withdraw. The question, then, is
whether that silence indicates legislative intent
either to grant or to deny members the right to
withdraw. From the system's inception, its
design has been such that certainty and stability of membership is necessary to achieve the
actuarial soundness sought by the legislature.
This objective could easily be imperiled if
political subdivisions that had joined the
system were free to withdraw at any time. This
suggests that under the terms of the original
statute, no such right was intended to be given
to those opting to join the system. Confirmatory evidence of this intention is the application form the city filed in 1979 to expand its
participation in the retirement system and to
join the public safety retirement system. That
application plainly .tates that enrollment in
the system is permanent and members may not
withdraw. Finally, S.B. 327 states in its preamble that it is a clarification of the laws as
they exist. See 1983 Utah Laws ph. 224 preamble. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that legislative silence at.the time the system
was created does got indicate that members
would, be w free * t6 withdraw at any time.
%&h±h wec*ncludc that thissilenceibbuldbe
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rawal was not permitted. Therefore, the city Utah 536, 566-69, 271 P. 961, 972-73
never had the right to ^withdraw unilaterally (1928); id. at 574, 271 P. at 975 (Gideon, J.,
from participation in the system, and we fund concurring); id. at 577, 271 P. at. 976
no merit in West Jordan's claims to the extent (Woolley, District Judge, concurring).
that they are based on the presumption that
The central question, then, is whether the
members could freely withdraw from the Board is performing a "municipal function"
system prior to S.B. 327's enactment.
within the meaning of article VI, section 28. A
Moving on to West Jordan's remaining brief background' on that section will be
challenges, we begin with the presumption of helpful. Article VI, section 28 is termed a
validity that must be accorded legislative "ripper clause/ See generally Porter, The
enactments when attacked on constitutional Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An
grounds. The burden is on those who would Early Urban Experiment-Parts 1 and //,
have us strike down an act. See, e.g., Lehi 1969 Utah L. Rev. 287, 450 [hereinafter
City v. Mciling, 87 Utah 237, 246-47, 48 ""Porter"). Its prototype first appeared in
P.2d 530, 535 (1935). In that light, we first Pennsylvania in the late 19th century, and it
consider West Jordan's claim that S.B. 327 was subsequently adopted by a total of eight
and the underlying retirement statutes2 violate states over the next few years. Id. at 306-11
article VI, section 28 of the Utah Constitution, & nn. 147-50. The motivation for the Pennwhich- denies the legislature authority to sylvania clause was to protect local govern"delegate to any special commission, private ment councils from having their particularly
corporation or association, any power ... to local functions usurped by special boards or
perform any municipal functions/ Utah commissions that were unrepresentative and
Const, art. VI, §28. This argument takes were often created by the state legislature at
several forms. First, West Jordan focuses on the behest of special interests. Id. at 306-11.
the fact that as a result of the changes made
These ripper clauses, although often written
by S.B. 327, if any municipality chooses to in virtually identical language, have been given
provide retirement benefits to its employees, it different interpretations in different states and
must become a member of the state retirement often within one state at different times. See id.
system and offer at least the benefits required at 310-11 & nn. 147-50, 481-90. This is
of system members. West Jordan seems to understandable to some extent because, for
contend that somehow the fact that member- example, conceptions of what constitutes an
ship in the state system is now mandatory area of uniquely local concern that ought to
rather than voluntary amounts to a violation be under the control of local governmentof article VI, section 28. This claim is merit- the concept underlying the ban on delegating
less.
the "performance of] any municipal functArticle VI, section 28 prohibits only the ions "--has varied among states and over
legislature's delegating certain powers relative time. See Utah Const, art. VI, §28; Porter at
to municipal matters to a special commission. 485 & nn. 178, 179. Particularly apt here is a
By requiring that municipalities offering reti- quotation from Porter in which he discusses
rement benefits do so in part through the state the indeterminacy of the meaning given other
retirement system, the legislature has not del- state constitutional provisions designed to
egated any powers to anyone; it has simply restrict legislative action with respect to subjregulated how municipalities must perform a ects described variously as "local affairs,"
function, if they choose to do it at all. Article "municipal purposes/ or "corporate purpVI, section 28 is not implicated by this fact oses":
alone. Therefore, the validity of the Board's
Although such phrases were meant
place in the retirement system is unaffected by
to serve as standards for the courts
the mandatory membership provision of S.B.
in determining the areas of city
|327.
.
',
.
action protected from legislative
West Jordan's second argument under
interference, they have been of
article VI, section 28 is directed against delelimited value because the only
gating to the Board responsibility to operate a
meaning that can be given to the
retirement program that covers municipal
words "local" and "municipal" on
employees. West Jordan contends that the
their face is geographical rather
Board is a "special commission" and that the
than legal. Since a geographical
provision of retirement benefits to municipal
definition would allow cities comemployees is a "municipal function." For the
plete freedom to act within their
purposes of argument, we will assume that the
boundaries, which would completely
Board constitutes a "special commission,"
disrupt state government, the final
although the Utah cases do not give this term
determination as to what is "local"
any clear meaning. See, e.g., Tygesen v.
or "municipal" is thrust upon the
Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 279-81,
judges, "who have no .guides to
226 P.2d 127; 129-31 *(1950); Uhi^City v. 1
decision except the often conflicting
MeWng, 87 Utah at^72-79, 48 P,2d<*t 546- |
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has been that the phrases "local
state and municipal governments to perform
affairs' and 'municipal functions'
the function, the degree to which the perforhave simply nol gained any empirmance of the function affects the interests of
ical meaning, even after a century
those beyond the boundaries of the municipof interpretation.
ality, and the extent to which the legislation
Porter at 295 (footnotes omitted).
under attack will intrude upon the ability of
This sort of uncertainty fairly characterizes the people within the municipality to control
the case law that, purports to give meaning to through their elected officials the substantive
the term "municipal functions" in article VI, policies that affect them uniquely. This last
section 28. A review of our decisions provides factor should .serve to ensure due deference to
relatively little by way of a consistent analyt- a paramount purpose of the ripper clause, as
ical framework for determining how to char- it has been interpreted in Utah: "'to prevent
acterize a given area of activity. See Porter at interference with local self-government.'"
473-78 & nn. 123, 128, 135, 140 (canvassing Municipal Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 111 P.2d at
all Utah cases decided before 1969); see also Salt 281 (quoting Lehi City v. MeiUng, 87 Utah at
Lake City v. International Ass'n of Fir- 272, 48 P.2d at 546). This sort of balancing
efighters Locals 1645, 593, 1654, and 2064, approach is best suited to accomplishing the
563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) (Crockett, J., purposes of the ripper clause without erecting
concurring) (stating that "municipal function" mechanical conceptual categories that, without
merely means "public function" and is not in serving any substantial interest, may hobble
any way distinct from the term "state func- the effective government which the state contion"). Compare, e.g., Municipal Bldg. Auth. stitution as a whole was designed to permit.
The foregoing approach leads us to concv. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 281-82 (Utah 1985)
(assuming arguendo that building a jail is a lude that the retirement systein statutes do not
municipal function), with Tribe v. Salt Lake delegate to the Board the performance of a
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 502-03 (Utah "municipal function." First, the state certainly
1975) (finding that construction of a parking has a legitimate interest in determining the
facility is a state rather than a municipal minimum level of retirement benefits provided
function), and Salt Lake County v. Murray to public employees by its political subdivisCity Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1342-43 ions, among others. Presumably, in the
(Utah 1979) (relying on Tribe for the propos- absence of the ripper clause, it could fix such
ition that fighting urban blight by means of minimums and require all political subdivisredevelopment* plans is a state rather than a ions to3 meet them under its general welfare
municipal function), and International Assfn power. It has so far chosen to permit local
of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 788-89 (holding subdivisions to decline to offer retirement
that providing firefighting services is a state benefits. That does not, as West Jordan
rather than a municipal function and stating argues, amount to an acknowledgment that it
the same of police and health protection). is a municipal affair beyond the state's power;
However, our more recent cases, such as Tribe rather, it is simply an accommodation to local
and International Ass'n of Firefighters, reflect government that may be considered in appraan increasing willingness to recognize that ising the legislation's intrusiveness.
many functions traditionally performed by
The Mate also has another legitimate interest
municipalities may be sufficiently infused with beyond the level of benefits provided retirees.
a state, as opposed to an exclusively local, The financial soundness of retirement systems
interest to escape characterization as into which monies attributable to employees
"municipal functions" for purposes of article are paid, including systems serving only govVI, section 28. This appears to be the appr- ernmental employees, is certainly a legitimate
oach advocated by Porter. See Porter at 486- subject of statewide concern. The legislature
87.
has chosen to further this interest by establisGiven that the cases establish no bright line hing a statewide retirement system for all
test for xietermining whether a function is government employees and by requiring that
municipal and that no Utah cases have consi- any political subdivisions offering retirement
dered a situation factually analogous to the benefits do so through the state system, the
retirement system at issue, we must at least actuarial soundness and financial integrity of
articulate our approach to this characterization which the legislature is assured through the
issue. We reject, as a general matter, the activities of the Board.
As for the relative abilities of state and local
search for any hard and fast categorization of
specific functions as "municipal" or "state." government to perform the function of provInstead, in determining whether a function is iding a financially sound retirement program,
municipal, we think it appropriate to take a there is every reason to believe that the state,
balancing approach, one which considers a by consolidating funds from many smaller
number of factors that are pertinent tq the political subdivisions and providing for contspecific legislation at issue. These include, but inuity and expertise in the management of the
are not limited to, the relative abilities of the funds, can do a better job than each separate
local unit of government.
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Finally, there is the critical question of the
challenged legislation's degree of intmsiveness
on local officials' control of policies that
uniquely affect their citizenry. The legislation
at issue leaves local units of government with
complete autonomy in deciding whether to
offer any retirement benefits. It also permits
the local governments to provide additional
benefits over and above those provided by the
state system. All it requires is that a local unit
of government that chooses to offer retirement
benefits do so through the state system at a
specified minimum level. That is the only
respect in which the legislation could be said
to interfere with control over uniquely local
matters. On the other hand, the Board, the
agency charged with the management of the
retirement systems, cannot be said to intrude
in any significant way in tHfe day-to-day
functioning of local government; it simply
manages the funds in an actuarily sound
fashion and pays benefits. On balance, we
conclude that the level of intmsiveness on
local self-government resulting from this
legislation is minimal and does not warrant
our holding that the policies underlying the
ripper clause are affected. Therefore, .we find
that the legislation does not delegate the performance of a municipal function to the
Board, as West Jordan claims.
West Jordan next claims that article XI,
section 5 of the Utah Constitution requires
that any classification of municipalities must
be on the basis of population only. West
Jordan contends that because sections 49-1123 and 49-6a-15 of the Code, which establish specific contribution rates to the state
retirement system for designated municipalities, classify municipalities on a basis other
than population, those statutes are unconstitutional. See Utah Code Ann. §§49-6a-14,
49-11-23 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (now codified
at Utah Code Ann. §§49-4-301, 49-5301 (Supp. 1988)).
In order to assess West Jordan's challenge,
we must first determine the scope of article
XI, section 5. The language upon which West
Jordan relies for its claim that all distinctions
between municipalities must be based on
population is underlined in the following
quotation of the first two sentences of article
XI, section 5:
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special
laws. The legislature by general laws
shall provide for the incorporation,
organization and classification of
cities and towns in proportion to
population, which laws may be
altered, amended or repealed.
Utah Const, art. XI, §5 (emphasis added).
We think that West Jordan takes the emphasized words out of context. This language is
not a general ban on the classification of.
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municipalities on. any grounds other than
population.4*Rather, it is simply part of a
provision establishing guidelines and limitations on tfce legislature's powers when it acts to
provide for the organization of municipalities.
The classifjcation-on-the-basis-of
population requirement of article XI, section
5 only applies to laws that classify municipalities for the purpose of defining their powers
and functions and directs that if such laws
make distinctions between the powers of
various municipalities, those distinctions must*
be on the basis of population only. Our review
of the state constitution and relevant precedent
has revealed no authority that contradicts this
interpretation of article XI, section 5, and
West Jordan has cited none. Cf. Towler v.
Warenski, 59 Utah 171, 174-77, 202 P. 374,
376-77 (1921) (stating that the legislature has
the power to classify cities for purposes of city
elections according to population, but that it
must provide some method for changing from
one class to another with shifts in population);
People v. Page, 6 Utah 353, 355-56, 23 P.
761, 761-62 (1890) (determining that city
officials should be elected as provided in a
statute that classified cities according to population rather than as provided in the city
charter); 1 E. McQuillin & C. Keating, The
Law of Municipal Corporations §§3.07, 3.08
(3d ed. 1987); 2 E. McQuillin, C. Keating & S.
Flanagan, The Law of Municipal Corporations
§§4.68-4.70, 4.73-4.74 (3d ed. 1988)
(indicating that constitutional provisions
similar to Utah's typically relate only to laws
that define the powers and functions of
municipalities). For this reason, we conclude
that article XI, section 5 does not apply to the
distinctions made by sections 49-11-23 and
49-6a-15.
West Jordan raises a number of other
claims of unconstitutional classification in the
retirement system's statutory contribution rate
schedule, which is set out in sections 49-6a15 and 49-11-23 and differentiates between
some municipalities. See Utah Code Ann.
§§49-6a-15, 49-11-23 (Supp. 1983)
(now codified at Utah Code Ann. §§49-4301, 49-5-301 (Supp. 1988)). West Jordan's
attack is facial, i.e., it merely says that the
distinctions exist and therefore they must be
invalid. By failing to support its argument
with any reasoning or authority, West Jordan
would have us shift the burden of justifying
these distinctions to the Board.
When considering challenges to matters of
economic regulation that do not affect specially protected interests, we give deference to
the legislature's judgment as to classifications
needed to achieve the ends sought. See, e^. t
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Cky
Corp., 752 P.2d at 888 (interpreting artide I,
section 24. of the Utah Constitution and
section 10-8-80 of the Utah Code) (citing Biter
v.^Mathcson, 607 P.2d 233, • 344 (Utah
UTAH ADVANCE JtEPORTS
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1979); State v. Taylor, 541 P.2d 1124, 1125- and that this is improper. The record does not
26 (Utah 1975), questioned on Other grounds, support this claim; therefore, we do not
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702 address it. But in declining -to consider this
P.2d 121, 125-27 (Utah 1985); Meniovc v. claim, we certainly do not mean to suggest
Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 209, 418 that any such diversion of retirement funds
P.2d*227, 231 (1966)). To strike down such would be permissible.
We have considered all of West Jordan's
legislation, we must find that the means are
not reasonably related to the achievement of a other claims and find them to be without
legitimate legislative purpose, see Mountain merit. We find tio issue of material fact suffFuel, 752 P.2d at 887, 890, and the burden is icient to preclude summary judgment. For the
on the party attacking the legislative enact- reasons stated, we affirm.
ment to show that it' offends the constitution.
This is a burden that West Jordan has wholly WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
failed to carry. Therefore, extensive analysis is
Richard C Howe, Associate Chief Justice
not necessary to defeat its claim. It is enough
1. Daniel Stewart, Justice
to say that it appears that each of the distinChristine M. Durham, Justice
ctions in sections 49-6a-15 and 49-11-23
is a recognition of actuarial experience and
that these distinctions account for existing 1. Senate Bill 327 also contains a number of other
differences among certain groups of employees amendments to the Utah State Retirement Act that
and among a few municipalities. As such, in are not at issue here. The principal amendments
the absence of a showing by West Jordan to involved in this case are S.B. 327's express requirthe contrary, we assume that they are reaso- ements that participating municipalities remain in
nably related to the maintenance of an actu- the retirement system and that municipalities
wishing to provide retirement benefits to employees
arially sound system for the provision of ret- participate
in the retirement fund, as well as the
irement benefits to municipal employees. See, bill's definition of "full participation" and its
e.g., S.B. 191, 38th session Utah Legislature, express authorization of supplemental coverage from
House of Representatives' Debates, 59th day sources other than the retirement fund See 1983
(Mar. 12, 1969), discs 9 (positions 12-27), 10 Utah U w s ch. 224, §§3, 6, 11, 12; Utah Code
(positions 0-17), 11 (positions 4-6) Ann. § § 4 9 - 6 a - 8 . 1 , 49-10-1 l ( l ) - ( 2 ) , (5)(discussing the different rates at which the (6), 49-11-14(1), (4), (5) (Supp. 1983) (now codiaffected state and municipal retirement funds fied at Utah Code Ann. §§49-2-204, 49-3were accumulating deficits and the appropri- 204,49-4-204,49-5-204 (Supp. 1987)).
ateness of different contribution rates to red- 2. West Jordan's article VI, section 28 claims
to be based in part on the provisions of the
ucing the deficits and making the funds actu- appear
retirement act that set forth the Board's existence
arially sound).
and duties See Utah Code Ann. §§49-9-1 toWest Jordan's next claim is that the effect 3 , - 7 , - 8 , - 1 1 , 4 9 - 1 0 - 9 , - 1 5 (1982 & S u p p .
of S.B. 327 is to impair the city's contractual 1983).
relations with either the Board or Beneficial 3. Examples of the legislature's exercise of its
Life in violation of article I, section 10 of the general welfare power in the area of employment
federal constitution and article I, section 18 of benefits include the Workers' Compensation Act,
the Utah Constitution. See U.S. Const, art. I, Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-1 to-107 (1988), the
§10;* Utah Const, art. I, §18.« Specifically, Occupational Disease Disability Act, id. %%35-21 to-65, and the Unemployment Compensation
West Jordan argues that S.B. 327 alters its Act,
id. §§35-4-1 to-26. These provisions,
contractual relationship with the Board by which require employers to provide certain benefits
prohibiting unilateral withdrawal. We find no analogous to retirement compensation, apply to
merit to this argument because, as has been political subdivisions as well as to private employers.
explained above, we conclude that West See id. § § 3 5 - 1 - 4 2 ( 1 ) , 3 5 - 2 1 0 ( a ) , 3 5 - 4 8.5(a). With respect to unemployment compensaJordan has never had the right to withdraw.
Also without merit is West Jordan's claim tion, the legislature has expressly declared the follthat its contrlct with Beneficial Life is impa- owing public policy:
Economic insecurity ... is a serious
ired by S.B. 327. First, as noted, West Jordan
menace to the health, morals, and
did not have that right when it entered its
welfare of the people of this state ....
agreement with Beneficial Life in 1981.
The Legislature, therefore, declares that
Second, West Jordan is not now, nor has it
in its considered judgment the public
ever been, prohibited from obtaining supplegood, and the general welfare of the
mental coverage from any private source,
citizens of this state require the enactincluding Beneficial Life, as it has done in the
ment of this measure, under the police
past.
power of the state ....
Finally, without citation to any factual fin- Id. §35-4-2. This exercise of the police power
dings of the trial court, any statutory or con- was tacitly upheld in Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v.
stitutional provisions, or any case law, counsel Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 175, 189, 134 P.2d
for West Jordan claims that from time to time 479, 485, reh'g denied, 104 Utah 196, 141 P.2d 694
the legislature has raided the retirement fund (1943). This Court has also upheld both of the other
to use the money for general state purposes acts against various constitutional challenges. See,
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e.g., Masich v. United States Smelting, Rcf. &
Mining Co., 113 Utah-101,423-27, 191 P.2d 612,
623-25, appeal dismissed, 335 J U . S . . 866 (1948)
(Occupational Disease Disability'Act); United Air
Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107
Utah 52, 61-62, 151 P.2d 591, 595 (1944)
(Workers' Compensation Act). Moreover, it could
be argued that the legislature has plenary power
over all conditions of employment in the state,
whether public or private, regardles of the ripper
clause. See Utah Const, art. XVI, §8.
4. In fact, a statutory classification based on population may violate the other provisions of our state
constitution that require laws to be uniform and
general, Utah Const, art. I, §24; id. art VI, §26,
if population is unrelated to the statute's purpose.
Sec, e.g., Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 496-98,
151 P. 51, 51-52 (1915); Love v. Liddle, 26 Utah
62, 65-69, 72 P. 185, 186-87 (1903); Laman v.
Harrill, 233 Ark. 967, 969-73, 349 S.W.2d 814,
816-18 (1961); Waybright v. Duval County, 142
Fla 875, 879-81, 895-901, ,196 So. 430, 432-33,
439-41 (1940); Berentz v. Board of Commissioners
of Coffeyville, 159 Kan. 58, 64-66, 152 P.2d 53, 5758 (1944); 2 E. McQuiliin, C. Keating & S. Flanagan, The Law of Municipal Corporations §4.74
(3d ed. 1988); see also Board of Education of Ogden
v. Hunter, 48 Utah 373, 383-87, 159 P. 1019, 102224 (1916) (holding a classification based on population and total assessed property valuation unconstitutional as a special and nonuniform law), cf.
Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223-24 (Utah
1980) (quoting Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah
Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 754, 755-56
(Utah 1977), for the proposition that legislative
classifications must be reasonable and must be
related to the legislation's purpose).
5. "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts...." U.S. Const, art. I, §10.
6. "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed." Utah Const, art. I, §18.,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v,
Fred W. STANDIFORD,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20345
FILED: December 30, 1988
THIRD DISTRICT
Honorable James S. Sawaya
ATTORNEYS: David L. Wilkinson, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt
* Lake City, for Appellee
David A. Hansen, Phil L. Hansen, Steven L.
Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
STEWART, JusticeDefendant Fred W. Standiford was convicted of second degree murder for the fatal
stabbing of Hisae Wood. He appeals the
conviction on a variety of grounds. We
affirm.
I. THE FACTS
Sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.
on April 27, 1984, Hisae Wood was stabbed to
death in an assault during which 107 stab
wounds were inflicted on her body. Earlier
that night, Standiford had been m^his garage
with his friend, Joey Granato, painting
Granato's Jeep. Twice during the evening,
Standiford and Granato went to Wood's residence to purchase cocaine. After each trip,
Standiford and Granato freebased the cocaine
and then resumed painting the Jeep. Around
4:00 a.m., Standiford told Granato that he
was going to a* convenience store to bu> cigarettes. Although he was gone longer than
necessary for that errand, his behavior was not
unusual when he returned. When Standiford
revealed that he had more cocaine, Granato
asked if. Standiford had returned to the
Woods' residence. Standiford replied that he
had not and indicated that he had merely
saved the cocaine from one of their earlier
purchases.
The next day, Standiford contacted Granato
and as.ced if he had heard that Mrs. Wood
had been murdered. Later that day, Standiford was questioned by the police. Afterwards,
he told Granato that they were both in trouble
and that if the police asked, Granato should
tell the police that he and Standiford had not
left the garage all night. Granato became
concerned, contacted the police, and volunte-
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construction of RCW 62A 9-318(1 )(a), and
the practical effect of allowing affirmative
claims, we conclude this section does not
allow account debtors, in this case Lydig,
an affirmative claim against an assignee,
Rainier >
The judgment of the Superior Court is
affirmed
GREEN, C J , and THOMPSON, J , concur
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Jack MORITZKY, d / b / a Jack Moritzky
Construction, Respondent,

plaint agamst construction company's con
tractor's bond The Superior Court, Yakima County, Bruce P Hanson, J , foreclosed
hen for the full $2,092 93, awarded homeowner $4,937 on the counterclaim, awarded
attorney fees to construction company,
and, filing a motion for reconsideration,
allowed costs to homeowner as prevailing
party Homeowner appealed The Court
of Appeals, Mclnturff, Acting C J , held
that (1) counterclaim asserted by homeowner was a compulson counterclaim
which homeowner had to assert or waive,
and (2) the action was tried as one lawsuit,
and despite holding that construction company was entitled to judgment for extras
sought under the hen, homeowner received
the affirmative net judgment, and was enti|led to an award of attorney fees under the
lien statute
Reversed in part and remanded

v
Henry S HEBERLEIN, Jr. and Wend\ J
Heberlein, husband and wife, individually and the marital community composed of them. Appellants,
Jack Moritzky
husband and
Construction
Third Party
dents

and Jane Doe Moritzky,
wife, d / b / a Jack Moritzky
and Western Surety Co ,
Defendants and Respon-

No 612i-HI-8
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3, Panel Three
April 2, 1985

Construction company filed suit to
foreclose mechanic's hen on house after
homeowner refused to pay for "extras"
requested by construction company, and
homeowner counterclaimed for negligent,
incomplete work, and various code viola
tions, and also asserted a third party com
5

Lvdig argues in the alternative that it should
be able to recover the payment under the theor>
of unjust enrichment The Uniform Commcr
cial Code provides "Unless displaced b> the
particular provisions of this Title, the principles
of law and equity
shall supplement its provi

1. Costs <s^32(2), 172
Determination of which party is the
prevailing party, whether for purpose of
awarding costs or attorney fees, is made on
basis of which part) has an affirmative
judgment*rendered in his case at the con
elusion of the entire case
2 Set-Off and Counterclaim <£=>60
Counterclaim asserted b\ homeowner
for negligent and incomplete construction
was a compulsory counterclaim to action
brought by construction compan\ to fore
close mechanic's lien, and thus, homeowner
had to assert such counterclaim or waive it
forever CR 13(a)
3 Mechanics' Liens <s=310(3)
Action to foreclose mechanic's lien, and
homeowner's counterclaim for negligent
and incomplete construction, which was a
compulsory counterclaim, was tried as one
lawsuit, and thus, despite holding that con
struction company was entitled to judg
sions
RCW 62A 1-103 Thus cquit) supple
merits the code only where code provisions do
not displace other rules Here, however RCW
62A 9-318(1 )(a) addresses this problem, and re
sort to other theories, which would possibl>
have produced a different result, is denied

1024
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ment for extras sought under the lien,
homeowner, who received the affirmative
net judgment, was entitled to attorney fees
under the lien statute. West's RCWA 60.04.130; CR 13(a).

torney fees for the lien foreclosure. It is
important to note that the Superior Court
expressly held Moritzky's lien judgment
would be set off against Heberlein's damages, providing for a net affirmative judgment to Heberlein.

Patrick Andreotti, Charles C. Flower,
Flower & Andreotti, Yakima, for appellants.

Following a motion for reconsideration,
the Superior Court did allow costs to Heberleir, as the prevailing party under RCW
4.84.030, but refused to change its ruling
on attorney fees under the hen statute,
RCW 60.04.130. Heberlein appealed. Both
parties request attorney fees on appeal.

John E. Maxwell, Blechschmidt & Maxwell, P.S., Inc., Grandview, for respondents.
McINTURFF, Acting Chief Judge.
Henry and Wendy Heberlein (Heberlein)
appeal an award of attorney fees to Jack
Moritzky, d/b/a Moritzky Construction
(Moritzky). We reverse.
In September 1981, Moritzky contracted
to frame and roof Heberlein's residence.
Construction began immediately. During
the course of the work, Moritzky failed to
comply with plans and specifications, performed work in a negligent manner, violated several Yakima building codes and did
not complete the framing work called for
by his contract. Heberlein paid Moritzky
for most of his labor, but refused to pay
$2,092.93 of "extras" requested by Moritzky.
On January 29, 1982, Moritzky filed a
lien for $2,092.93 with the Yakima County
Auditor. Three months later, suit was
commenced to foreclose the lien. Heberlein answered the suit by counterclaiming
for the negligent, incomplete work and the
various code violations. Heberlein also asserted a'third party complaint against Moritzky's contractor's bond, Western Surety
Company.

Heberlein contends he was the prevailing
party under RCW 60.04.130 because of the
net affirmative judgment following the setoffs. Moritzky argues that he was the
prevailing party on the lien claim since the
court foreclosed the entire lien. Moritzky
contends the counterclaim was a separate
action, and the trial court correctly awarded attorney fees in the manner described
above, citing Johnson v. Thompson Construction, 1 Wash.App. 194, 460 P.2d 291
(1969).
Johnson is clearly distinguishable from
the present case in that it involved former
RCW 60.04.130 which read, in pertinent
part:
The court may allow, as part of the costs
of the action, the moneys paid for filing
or recording the claim, and a reasonable
attorney's fee in the superior and supreme courts.
In 19G9. that section of RCW 60 04.130 was
amended to read;
The court may allow to the prevailing
party in the action, whether plain tiff' or
defendant, as part of the cosu of the
action, the moneys paid for filing or re
cording the chum, and a reasonable attorney's fee in the superior and supreme
court.
(Italics ours )

Following trial, the Superior Court, in its
oral opinion: (a) foreclosed Moritzky's lien
for the full $2,092.93; (b) awarded Heberlein $4,937 on the counterclaim for negligent and defective work; (c) decided He[ 1 ] Thus, the -disposition of this case
berlein's counterclaim was an "independent
turns on the definition of "prevailing par
action" from the lien foreclosure under ty".. Determination of which party is the
RCW 60.04, thus no attorney fees and/or prevailing party,-whether for the purpose
costs could be awarded Heberlein; and (d) fl^f.ajvarjdmp costs o n a t t o r n e y f e e s , is made
awarded Moritzky $2,008.80 reasonable at- on trifrfrasis of*which party has an affirma-
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tivejudgment ren(d_eredjnJii§J[avor at the
conclusion,w&the*entire 9t case. Ennis v.
Ring, 56 Wash.2d 465, 353 R2d 950 (1959);
Stott v. Cervantes, 23 Wash.App. 346, 595
P.2d 563 (1979).
[2,3] The counterclaim asserted by Heberlein for the negligent and incomplete
construction was a "compulsory" counterclaim under CR 13(a). Heberlein had to
assert such a counterclaim or that claim
would be waived forever. 3A L. Orland,
Wash.Prac, Rules Practice, § 5162 (1980).
This action was tried as one lawsuit, and
despite the holding that Moritzky was entitled to judgment for the extras sought
under the lien, Heberlein received the affirmative net judgment.
The Superior Court erred in awarding
attorney fees to Moritzky, and did not exercise its discretion in determining Heberlein's attorney fees. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment awarding attorney
fees is reversed; the matter is remanded to
determine attorney fees to Heberlein, if
any, for the trial and to set attorney fees
on the appeal to Heberlein as the prevailing
party on appeal.
THOMPSON and MUNSON, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Clifford Brian KOMOTO, Appellant.
No. 13969-0-1.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
April 8, 1985.

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, King County, Lee Kraft, J., of
felony hit and run, and he appealed. The

Court of Appeals, Coleman, J., held that:
(1) testimony of two witnesses that they
observed green car hit victim without stopping, coupled with evidence of injury to
accident victim, was sufficient to establish
corpus delicti of felony hit and run; (2)
evidence was sufficient to allow case to
proceed to jury; (3) troopers had probable
cause to believe blood alcohol would be
relevant; and (4) warrantless entry of defendant's residence was justified.
Affirmed.

1. Automobiles <£=>353
To prove that someone has committed
offense of driving while under influence,
state must show that defendant operated
or was in actual physical control of vehicle
while he was under influence.
2. Automobiles <s=>332
Defendant's physical condition is critical element of crime of driving while under
the influence.
3. Automobiles e ^ S S
Felony hit and run does not require
any showing of defendant's physical state,
rather, it requires proof that driver did not
perform duties specified in statute and,
thus, proof of condition of driver is not
necessary to establish existence of criminal
agency in felony hit and run.
West's
RCWA 46.52.020.
4. Criminal Law <3=>535(1)
Conviction cannot be sustained on confession alone, but, rather, some corroborative evidence establishing corpus delicti is
necessary to convict when confession ispart of evidence.
5. Criminal Law <£=>563
Proof of corpus delicti of any crime
requires evidence that crime charged was
committed by someone; amount of proof
needed is evidence of sufficient circumstances which would support logical and
reasonable deduction of fact sought to be
proved, which is less than that necessary to
take case to jury.
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Melroy L MEDHUS, Jr., Ben Williams,
Billy G. Reddig and Lynne A. Reddig,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Kenneth A. DUTTER, Mary E. Dutter,
Thomas J. Deutsch and J a n e t M.
Deutsch, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 14693.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs Aug. 15, 1979.
Decided Nov. 21, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1979.

Action was brought to enjoin defendants from obstructing plaintiffs' use of the
road that crossed defendants' property and
to recover damages for interference with
use of the road and for trespass, with defendants counter-claiming for timber trespass and an order requiring one plaintiff to
move a fence. The Eleventh District Court,
Flathead County, Robert Sykes, J., found
that plaintiffs had an easement for roadway purposes across one portion of respondents' property but not another and ordered
fence moved, and appeal was taken. The
Supreme Court, Harrison, J., held that: (1)
since use of road began permissibly and
continued to be permissive until defendant
blocked the road, plaintiffs had not established the existence of a prescriptive easement; (2) language in warranty deed, by
which defendants acquired the property, referring to an easement for road purposes
did not establish an easement of record; (3)
trial court should have made findings and
entered judgment on plaintiff's trespass
claim; (4) main issue in controversy rule
applies in interpreting cost statute; and (5)
district court correctly awarded cost to respondents, including cost of survey necessary to determine boundary.
Affirmed in part and remanded with
Hir«>etiona

1. Easements <*=5
To establish existence of a prescriptive
easement, the party claiming the easement
must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of
the easement claimed for the statutory |>eriod.
2. Easements *=>5
Since use of road was permissive at its
inception, to find a prescriptive easement
there was required to be a showing of a
distinct and positive assertion of the right
to use the road hostile to the owners by
those claiming the easement, that such
right was brought to the attention of the
owners and that such use continued for the
full statutory period.
3. Easements «=»36(1)
Occasional use of disputed road by
hunters, hikers and neighbors for cutting
Christmas trees and gathering firewood
was insufficient to raise a presumption of
adverse use for purpose of acquisition of
prescriptive easement.
4. Easements <&=^14(3)
An easement cannot be created in favor of a stranger to a deed, however, courts
will depart from that rule to give effect to
the grantor's intent.
5. Easements <*=>14(3)
Before creation of an easement in a
stranger to a conveyance will be recognized
the intent of the grantor to create an easement must be clearly shown.
6. Easements «=>14(3)
If it appears it is as likely that purpose
of a clause in a deed is to protect grantor's
warranty of title as to reserve an easement
in a stranger to the conveyance the court
will not depart from majority rule and,
hence, will not find an easement.
7. Easements *=»14(3)
To determine the intent of a grantor to
create an easement in a stranger to a conveyance courts have considered the expressed language of the deed, testimony bygrantor stating their intent, whether grantor received less value for the property because of the easement and sufficiency of
dear.rint.inn nf the location of t h e e a s e m e n t
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and whether or not the reservation names a
dominant tenement.
8. Easements <s=*14(3)
Language in warranty deed referring
to easement for road purposes was insufficient to establish easement of record in
owners of adjacent tract in view of grantor's testimony that there was a road up to
home on the property that nobody other
than the owners should be using, want of
testimony showing that grantors received
less than full value because of the easement
and considering that although language in a
deed located the easement it failed to name
a dominant tenement.
9. Trespass <s=>69
Where plaintiff elicited testimony at
hearing supporting his claim of trespass the
trial court should have entered findings,
conclusions or judgment concerning the
matter.
10. Costs $=>4
Main issue in controversy rule is to be
used in interpreting the Montana cost statutes. MCA 25-10-101, 25-10-102.
11. Costs e=32(3)
If a plaintiff files a complaint in an
action covered by the cost statute and succeeds only partially, plaintiff is entitled to
costs. MCA 25-10-101.
12. Costs <a=>32(5)
If in an action subject to the cost statute the defendant counterclaims and succeeds in having plaintiff's claim totally denied but only recovers a portion of the
relief demanded in the counterclaim, the
defendant should receive costs; however, if
a party initiates a lawsuit, the defendant
counterclaims and the judgment awards
both parties part of the relief they seek, the
party prevailing on the main issue in controversy in the case must be allowed costs.
MCA 25-10-101, 25-10-102.
13. Boundaries <^=>45
Costs *=>32(5)
Costs were properly allowed defendants in action to enjoin them from obstructing plaintiffs' use of a road that crossed

defendants' property as well as damage for
trespass and for interference with use of
the road, with defendants counterclaiming
for timber trespass and order requiring one
plaintiff to move a fence erected along
boundary line, since main issue was existence of an easement across disputed road,
closing of the road precipitated the suit and
most of the testimony at trial concerned
existence of easement over the road and
defendants prevailed on such issues; defendants were also entitled to cost of
boundary survey. MCA 25-10-101, 2 5 - 1 0 102.
Hash, Jellison, O'Brien & Bartlett, Kalispell, for appellants.
Moore, Lympus & Doran, Warden, Walterskirchen & Christiansen, Kalispell, for
respondents.
HARRISON, Justice.
Appellants initiated this action in District
Court, the Eleventh Judicial District, the
Honorable Robert C. Sykes presiding, asking the court to enjoin respondents from
obstructing appellants' use of a road that
crossed respondents' property. Appellants
sought to obtain a decree granting them an
easement along the road. Appellants also
sought damages for interference with the
use of the road, and appellant Medhus
sought damages for trespass to his propertyRespondents filed a counterclaim against
appellant Medhus for timber trespass and
sought an order requiring Medhus to move
a fence erected along the boundary of their
property and the Medhus property.
The District Court found that appellants
had an easement for roadway purposes
across a portion of respondents' property,
but found no easement across another section of the property. The court ordered
appellants be allowed to remove some personal property from the portion of the roadway across which no easement was found.
However, the court entered no findings,
conclusions or judgment concerning appellants' trespass claim.
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The court further found appellant Medhus had not committed timber trespass but
had erected a fence on respondents' property. The court ordered the fence moved to
the correct boundary line. The District
Court awarded costs of the suit to respondents, including the cost of a boundary survey done at the request of respondents.
Appellants appeal this judgment.
Respondents Thomas Deutsch and Janet
Deutsch are the legal owners, and respondents Kenneth Dutter and Mary Dutter are
the equitable owners, being purchasers under contract for deed, of certain real property located in Flathead County. The disputed road passes across their property.
The Deutsches acquired the property in
1964 from A. P. and Martha T. Marcoux.
The Marcouxes conveyed the property to
the Deutsches by a warranty deed. The
deed contained language referring to an
easement for road purposes across the
premises. The notice of purchasers' interest giving notice of the contract under
which the Dutters hold their equitable interest to the property contains similar language. This property will be referred to as
the "Dutter property/'
Appellant Melroy Medhus owns real property that lies east of the Dutter property
and above it on a mountainside. This property will be referred to as the "Medhus
property." Appellants Billy G. Reddig and
Lynne A. Reddig are buying a portion of
the Medhus property under contract for
deed. Appellant Ben Williams is the owner
of three parcels of real property which are
«ast of both the Dutter and Medhus properties.
Foothills Road, a public highway, passes
close to the western boundary of the Dutter
property. Near the southern boundary of
the Dutter property a dirt and gravel road
leaves Foothills Road and goes up the
mountainside across the Dutter property.
This roadway leaves the Dutter property
and enters the Medhus property and forms
a "Y" on the Medhus property. The District Court found, apparently for the sake
of completeness, that all of the appellants
had an easement along that roadway from

the Foothills Road to the boundary of the
Dutter property. An easement over this
section of road was not asked for in appellants' complaint. The northern branch of
the "Y" continues across the Medhus property and reenters the Dutter property for
300 feet whereupon it reenters the Medhus
property and continues easterly and up the
mountainside onto the Williams property.
The District Court found that none of the
appellants had an easement across this 300
foot road on the Dutter property.
The following diagram approximates the
position of the property of the parties and
road in dispute (marked "disputed road" on
the diagram);

t

Hood oort * * * C M O s " < » Cevir

The use of the 300 foot road marked
"disputed road" on the diagram is the center of controversy in this case Appellants
do not contest the portion of the judgment
ordering them to move their fence, and
respondents do not challenge the finding of
an easement of the other section of the
road. The Trablik property marked on the
diagram is not involved in the current dispute.
The road was built in 1933 by the Koenig
brothers, loggers working east of the Dutter and Medhus properties. Before constructing and using the road, the loggers
got permission from Clarence Haines, then
the owner of the Dutter property. The
District Court found that since the 1930's,
the disputed road has seldom been used.
The court found that neighbors used the
road for cutting firewood or Christmas
trees and members of the general public
used the road to go up Mill Creek to hunt,
hike and gather huckleberries. The bridge
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over Mill Creek leading to the road washed
out for a period of time and was replaced in
the 1970's. Dutter bulldozed the road shut
in 1978, leading to the instigation of this
suit.
This appeal raises the following issues for
our consideration:
1. Did the District Court err in finding
that appellants did not establish a prescriptive easement across the disputed road?
2. Did the District Court err in finding
that appellants did not establish an easement of record across the disputed road?
3. Did the District Court err in not entering findings, conclusions and a judgment
on appellants' trespass claim?
4. Did the District Court err in awarding costs to the respondents?
[1] To establish the existence of a prescriptive easement, the party claiming the
easement must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
use of the easement claimed for the statutory period. Garrett v. Jackson (1979), Mont.,
600 P.2d 1177, 36 St.Rep. 1769, 1771; Hayden v. Snowden (1978), Mont., 576 P.2d
1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. 367, 369; Taylor v.
Petranek (1977), Mont., 568 P.2d 120, 122, 34
St.Rep. 905, 909; Harland v. Anderson
(1976), 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615.
The controversy in this case turns on
whether appellants showed the use of the
disputed road by them and their predecessors in interest was adverse rather than
permissive. If appellants failed to show
adverse use, they have not established all
the elements necessary to perfect an easement by prescription and the District Court
ruling on this issue must be upheld.
In Taylor, we said:
"Although a use permissive in its inception may ripen into a prescriptive right, it
cannot do so unless there is a later distinct and positive assertion of a right
hostile to the owner, which must be
brought to the attention of the owner,
and the use continued for the full prescriptive period. (Citations omitted.)"
568 P.2d at 123.

In Wilson v. Chestnut (1974), 164 Mont.
484, 491, 525 P.2d 24, 27, we approvingly
quoted 2 Thompson on Real Property (1961
Replacement), Easements, § 345, as follows:
" '.
. I f the user began by the permission of the owner, it will not ripen
into an adverse or hostile right until notice of such adverse user is brought home
to the owner and the user continued
thereafter for the statutory period.'"
See also White v. Kamps (1946), 119 Mont.
102, 171 P.2d 343.
[2] Here, the testimony shows the use of
the disputed road was originally permissive.
Clarence Haines gave the Koenig brothers
permission to build and use the road. Since
the use of the road was permissive at its
inception, to find a prescriptive easement
here we must find in the record a distinct
and positive assertion of a right to use the
disputed road hostile to the owners by those
claiming the easement. The record must
also show the right was brought to the
attention of the owners and continued use
of the easement for the full statutory period.
[3] Looking to the record, we find occasional use of the road by hunters, hikers
and neighbors cutting Christmas trees and
gathering firewood. We have previously
held this type of use insufficient to raise a
presumption of adverse use. Taylor v. Petranek, supra, 568 P.2d at 123; Harland v.
Anderson, supra, 169 Mont, at 451-452, 548
P.2d 613. Being insufficient to initially establish adverse use, this type of use does
not represent the distinct and positive assertion of a hostile right brought home to
the owner of the purportedly servient tenement necessary to transform originally permissive use into adverse use. Under these
facts, the use of the road began permissively and continued to be permissive until Dutter blocked the road in 1978. Appellants,
therefore, did not establish the existence of
a prescriptive easement across the Dutter
property.
The second issue raised by this appeal
concerns the language in the deeds used to
convey the Dutter property. The language
in the deeds reads, "Subject, however to an
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easement for road purposes now existing
over and across the herein described premises."
[4] The majority rule is that an easement cannot be created in favor of a stranger to the deed. Wilson v. Chestnut, supra,
164 Mont, at 492, 525 P.2d 24, see also
Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1199, 1201-1202 (1963).
In the proper case, however, we will depart
from that rule to give effect to the grantor's intent State of Montana, By and
Through the Montana State Fish and Game
Commission v. Cronin (1978), Mont., 587
P.2d 395, 399, 35 St.Rep. 1798, 1802; Wilson,
164 Mont, at 492, 525 P.2d 24. The question
thus becomes one of determining the intent
of the grantors in including the above language in the deeds.
[S-7] Before the creation of an easement in a stranger to a conveyance will be
recognized, the intent of the grantor to
create the easement must be clearly shown.
Cushman v. Davis (1978), 80 Cal.App.3d 731,
145 Cal.Rptr. 791, 793. If it appears it is as
likely the purpose of the clause in the deed
was to protect the grantor's warranty of
title as to reserve an easement, we will not
depart from the majority rule and find an
easement. Wilson, 164 Mont, at 492, 525
P.2d 24. To determine the intent of the
grantor in situations similar to the case at
bar, courts have considered the express language of the deed, Wilson, 164 Mont, at 492,
525 P.2d 24; testimony by grantors stating
their intent, Willard v. First Church of
Christ, Scientist, Pacifica (1972), 7 Cal.3d
473, 102 Cal.Rptr. 739, 498 P.2d 987, 989;
the fact that the grantor received less value
for the property conveyed because of the
existence of an easement, Mott v. Stanlake
(1975), 63 Mich.App. 440, 234 N.W.2d 667,
668, and Willard, 498 P.2d at 989-990; and,
the sufficiency of the description of the
location of the easement and whether or not
the reservation names a dominant tenement, State of Montana, By and Through
the State Fish and Game Commission v.
Cronin, supra, 587 P.2d at 399.
[8] Considering these factors here, we
find the lantruatre contained in the deed

almost identical to the language in Wilson,
where we held no easement had been reserved. Further, respondent Deutsch stated he knewr the deed contained the language and had discussed it with appellant
Bill Reddig, but that he did not know the
implications of the language. Deutsch said
he did know there was a road up to the
home on the Dutter property that nobody
other than the owners should be using.
This testimony indicates that in executing
the documents that passed equitable title to
the property, Deutsch did not intend to
create an easement. There is no testimony
on the record showing any of the grantors
of the Dutter property received leas than
full value for the land because of the existence of an easement. Finally, although the
language of the deed does locate the easement, it fails to name a dominant tenement.
Considering these factors together, here, as
in Wilson, it is as likely the grantors intended to protect their warranty of title as to
reserve an easement. Thus, the deeds do
not establish an easement of record.
The third issue raised by this appeal involves the failure of the District Court to
enter findings, conclusions or a judgment
concerning Count IV of appellants' complaint. This count alleges Dutter trespassed on the Medhus property while bulldozing the disputed road shut and damaged
the property by removing gravel to build
the Kelly bump that blocked the road.
[9] Appellants elicited testimony at the
hearing on this case supporting the claim.
The trial judge did not, however, enter
findings, conclusions or judgment concerning the matter. The District Court should
have made findings concerning this issue
and entered a judgment accordingly. Claver v. Rosenquist (1972), 160 Mont. 4, 13, 499
P.2d 1235, 1240. We therefore return the
matter to the District Court with instructions to enter findings, conclusions and a
judgment on this issue. In doing so, the
court should hold whatever further proceedings, if any, it deems necessary.
The final issue raised here deals with the
award of costs to respondents. Sections
25-10-101 and 25-10-102, MCA, control the
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disposition of this question. Those sections
require the awarding of costs to the plaintiffs or the defendants in cases of this nature upon a judgment in their favor.
In this case, the judgment granted appellants an easement over a portion of respondents' property, but denied appellants any
right to use the section of road over which
the appellants prayed for an easement in
their complaint. On remand, the District
Court may find in favor of appellants or
respondents on appellants' trespass claim.
The judgment stated respondents should
take nothing by their counterclaim but also
ordered Medhus to move his fence. Respondents had ^^cequested the fence be
moved as part of ttieir counterclaim.
The judgment thus found in favor of both
parties to the
suit on different issues
involved in the case. We have previously
held that a plaintiff need not recover on all
claims presented by a complaint to be entitled to costs under section 25-10-101, MCA.
Jones v. Great Northern Railroad Company
(1923), 68 Mont. 231, 242-245, 217 P. 673,
677-678. We have also allowed a defendant to recover costs when only partially
successful on a counterclaim but totally successful in defeating the plaintiff's claim.
Spencer v. Mungus (1903), 28 Mont. 357,
359-360, 72 P. 663, 664. We have never
squarely faced, however, the issue of
awarding costs in a case where the plaintiff
partially succeeds on the complaint and the
defendant prevails as to a part of the counterclaim. In the only case presenting the
question, the Court decider] in favor of the
defendant without discussion. Aronow v.
Hill (1930), 87 Mont. 153, 163, 286 P. 140,
144.
Montana adopted its cost statute from
California. That state still has a similar
statutory setup for awarding costs. Section
1032, Cal.Code Civ.Proc. In interpreting
their cost statutes, the California courts
have come to the same result reached in
Aronow by determining which party prevailed on the main issue in controversy in a
case. Whiting v. Squeglia (1924), 70 Cal.
App. 108, 232 P. 986, 990. In Whiting the
plaintiffs filed a complaint and the defend-

ant counterclaimed. The trial court entered a judgment granting the plaintiffs
part of the relief they requested and the
defendant part of his claim with costs to
the defendant. Whiting, 232 P. at 987. On
appeal, the award of costs was upheld under the costs statute based on the rationale
that the defendant had prevailed on the
main issue in controversy and, therefore,
judgment had been entered in his favor.
Whiting, 232 P. at 990.
[10-12] Given the use of the main issue
in controversy rule in California in interpreting cost statutes similar to those in
Montana, we now adopt the rule in Montana for interpreting sections 25-10-101
and 25-10-102, MCA. If a plaintiff files a
complaint in an action covered by section
25-10-101, MCA, and succeeds only partially, the plaintiff is entitled to costs. If an
action is filed, the defendant counterclaims
and succeeds in having the plaintiff's claim
totally denied but only recovers a portion of
the relief demanded in the counterclaim,
the defendant should receive costs.
If,
however, a party initiates a law suit, the
defendant counterclaims, and the judgment
awards both parties part of the relief they
seek, the party prevailing on the main issue
in controversy in the case must be allowed
costs.
[13] Applying this rule to the case at
bar, we find the District Court correctly
awarded costs to respondents. The main
issue in controversy here was the existence
of an easement across the disputed road.
The closing of the road precipitated the law
suit and most of the testimony at the trial
concerned the existence of an easement
over the road. Respondents prevailed on
that issue. The cost statutes therefore entitled them to their costs of suit, including
the cost of the survey necessary to determine boundary between the Medhus and
Dutter properties.
The judgment is affirmed in part but
remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter a judgment on appellants' trespass claim.
HASWELL, C. J., and DALY, SHEA and
SHEEHY, JJ., concur.
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CITY OF YAKUTAT, Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
v.
Frank L. RYMAN, Jr., Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 6033, 6099.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Nov. 5, 1982.
Taxpayer brought action against firstclass city to obtain a refund of general
property taxes. The Superior Court, First
Judicial District, Juneau, Allen T. Compton,
J., entered judgment in favor of taxpayer
for the years 1974 and 1975 and awarded
costs and attorney fees, but entered judgment in favor of city for year 1976 and
denied costs and attorney fees, and city
appealed and taxpayer cross-appealed. The
Supreme Court, Rabinowitz, J., held that:
(1) first-class city failed to substantially
comply with statutory requirements so as to
establish validity of the 1974 and 1975 general property taxes imposed; (2) the delay
of nine days in setting the mill levy, with
the resulting 20-day delay in giving written
notice to each person named in the assessment role, fell within the range of substantial compliance with the statutory requirements and did not, therefore, require an
invalidation of the 1976 general property
tax in absence of a showing of prejudice;
and (3) an award of costs and attorney fees
was warranted.
Affirmed.

input into assessment process are more likely to be classified as mandatory.
3. Taxation e=>363
Statutory provisions governing form
and duration of notice to taxpayer as to his
tax liability or his right to contest assessment must be strictly construed.
4. Taxation <3=>319(1)
Statutory requirements which are intended to serve primarily as guidelines for
orderly conduct of public business are more
likely to be considered directory in tax
cases.
5. Municipal Corporations @=>968(1)
Statutory deadline for assessment of
general property taxes by a first-class city
outside a borough, the setting of the mill
levy, and the mailing of tax statements are
directory rather than mandatory and precise conformity to them is not a condition
precedent to imposition of a valid tax. AS
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
6. Municipal Corporations e=>971(4)
Failure of first-class city to meet statutory deadlines for assessment of general
property taxes did not operate to automatically invalidate those taxes given lack of
negative prohibitions in governing statute
as to time of ;>crformance. fact that deadlines did not govern right to notice or opportunity for a hearing, and potential adverse impact of imposition of a strict compliance rule on local governments AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).

1. Taxation <&=>318
Where specific time requirements are
accompanied by negative words that signify
that acts shall not be done at any time
other than those designated, courts are constrained to hold that an assessment may not
be made in violation of statutory schedule.

7. Municipal Corporations <s=971(4)
When taxpayer establishes a violation
of the "directory" procedures set forth in
the statute for imposition of genera! proj>erty taxes by a first-class city, the burden
should be on the taxing authority to demonstrate substantial compliance with the requirements and purposes of statute. AS
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).

2. Taxation «=*319(1)
Statutory requirements designed to
protect taxpayers in their dealings with
taxing authorities or to facilitate taxpayer

8. Municipal Corporations <s=1000(5)
Once a showing of substantial compliance with the requirements and purposes of
the statute has been made by a first-class
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city for imposition of general property taxes, the action of the taxing authority will be
upheld unless the taxpayer is able to demonstrate that the noncompliance resulted in
substantial prejudice to its interests. AS
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
9. Municipal Corporations <s=»974(3)
Where first-class city fails to establish
substantial compliance with the requirements and purposes of the statute for imposition of general property taxes, prejudice
to the taxpayer will be presumed and the
tax or assessment will be overturned. AS
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
10. Municipal Corporations <$=>971(4)
First-class city failed to substantially
comply with statutory requirements so as to
establish validity of the 1974 and 1975 general property taxes imposed by it where,
aside from fact that assessment notices and
tax statements were not provided, there
were no equalization hearings, city did not
set the 1974 mill levy until 1975 and was
not only three months late in setting the
1975 levy, but was 15 months late in mailing the tax statements to property owners.
AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
11. Taxation <s=>363
The delay of nine days in setting the
mill levy, with the resulting 20-day delay in
giving written notice to each person named
in the assessment roll, fell within the range
of substantial compliance with the statutory requirement and did not, therefore, require an invalidation of the 1976 general
property tax in absence of a showing of
prejudice to taxpayer's interest such as a
deprivation of his right to contest or appeal
the assessment. AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
12. Municipal Corporations <s=>971(4)
One of the ways in which a taxpayer
may be prejudiced by a delay in receiving
notice of an assessment of general property
taxes by a first-class city, so that tax or
assessment may be overturned, is if he is
deprived of his right to contest or appeal
the assessment. AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
13. Municipal Corporations @=> 1000(7)
It could not be said that because seven
of eleven original claims against first-class

city were abandoned, city prevailed as 1
tax assessment claims so as to precluc
taxpayer from obtaining an award of cos1
and fees in his favor, even though clairr
were mooted by corrective actions taken b
city, where those corrective actions wer
made in response to those claims. AS 29
43.020, 29.53.170(b).
14. Costs «=>32(3)
Anfawardof costs and iees in favor c
taxpayerswas nott.precluded^on ground tha
taxpayer did not prevail against first-clas
city on tax refund claim, nQtwj|hstandinj
that#aitpayers total recovery was less thai
generajjorpperty tax for two of the thre«
yea>s in question "wS^nvalidated and tax
pa^^cofnplaint succeeded in forcing th<
city fS^orhply with the statutory proce
dures for assessing general property taxes
AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b).
15. Costs e=>172
Refusing taxpayer's request for full attorney fees in suit against first-class cit)
for refund of general property taxes wa<
not an abuse of discretion, even though suit
qualified as public interest litigation, where
both sides expended unreasonable amounts
of time and energy and amount awarded
was sufficient for taxpayer to present his
case adequately. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 82.
16. Costs <z=>H2

Taxpayer was not entitled to a higher
attorney fee award under the "complex litigation" exception to the rule in his action
against first-class city for refund on general
property taxes where most of his claims
were dismissed as moot and the remainder,
disposed of via summary judgment and
stipulation, were not particularly complex
or difficult. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 82.
17. Costs <£=>172
Where the trial court correctly characterized the taxpayer's suit against the
third-class city for refund of general property taxes as public interest litigation, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the taxpayer $15,000 in attorney
fees under the "public interest" exception
to the general rule even if the amount did
equal full "reasonable" attorney fees.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 82.
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18. Costa «=172
A trial court is not bound to award full
attorney fees to a prevailing taxpayer under the public interest exception under the
general rule, but may exclude charges it
finds to be unreasonable. Rules Civ.Proa,
Rule 82.

Patrick M. Anderson, Hedland, Fleischer
& Friedman, Anchorage, for appellant,
cross-appellee.
L.B. Jacobson, Robertson, Monagle, Eastaugh & Bradley, Juneau, for appellee,
cross-appellant.
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ,
CONNOR and MATTHEWS, JJ.
OPINION
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
The City of Yakutat is a first class city
not within an organized borough. It has
1. AS 29.43.020 provides
Assessment and tax collection. Home rule
and first class cities outside boroughs may
assess, levy and collect a general property
tax. A property tax if levied must be assessed, levied and collected as provided by
ch. 53 of this title for boroughs Cities outside boroughs may levy and collect sales and
use taxes as provided by ch 53 of this title
for boroughs
2.

3.

AS 29.53 060(a) reads
Full and true value (a) The assessor shall
assess property at its full and true value as of
January 1 of the assessment year, except as
provided in this section and AS 29.53 030,
29.53.035 and 29.53.160 The full and true
value is the estimated price which the prop
erty would bring in an open market and under the theYi prevailing market conditions in a
sale between a willing seller and a willing
buyer both conversant with the property and
with prevailing general price levels
AS 29.53 100(a) reads
The assessor shall prepare an annual assessment roll The roll contains
(1) a description of all taxable property;
(2) the assessed value of all taxable prop
erty,
(3) the names and addresses of persons
with property subject to assessment and taxation.

the power to levy genera! property taxes in
accordance with the procedures set out in
AS 29.53.010-.390.1 Under those procedures, the municipal assessor assesses real
property at its value as of January 1 of the
assessment year. 2 On the basis of this information, the assessor prepares an assessment roll containing a description of all
taxable property, the assessed value of this
property, and the names and addresses of
the owners of property subject to taxation. 3
The assessor then provides written notice to
each person named in the assessment roll;
this notice is to be mailed at least 30 days
prior to the equalization hearings. 4 The
city assembly sits as a board of equalization
for the purpose of hearing any appeals from
the determinations of the municipal assessor.5 Any resultant changes or adjustments
in property valuations must be certified by
the board to the assessor within seven days,
and the assessor is then directed to file the
final assessment roll by June l. 6 Finally,
4.

AS 29.53.110 reads:
Assessment notice, (a) The assessor shall
give every' person named in the assessment
roll a notice of assessment, showing the assessed value of his property. On each notice
is printed a brief summary of the dates when
taxes are payable, delinquent and subject to
penalty and interest, and the dates when the
board of equalization will sit.
(b) Sufficient assessment notice is given if
mailed by first class mail 30 days before the
equalization hearings If the address is not
known to the assessor, the notice may be
addressed to the person at the post office
nearest the property. Notice is effective on
the date of mailing

5.

AS 29.53.135

6.

AS 29.53.140 reads:
Hearing
(a) If an appellant fails to ap
pear, the board of equalization may proceed
with the hearing in his absence.
(b) The appellant bears the burden of
proof.
(c) The only grounds for adjustment is
proof of unequal, excessive or improper valuation based on facts which are stated in a
valid written appeal timely filed or proved at
the hearing
(d) The board shall certify its actions to
the assessor within seven days.
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the assembly determines the rate of levy
before June 15 of each assessment year, and
tax statements are mailed to property owners by July 1 of the assessment year.7
In 1974 the City failed to assess or levy
real property taxes. The City did not provide assessment notices to proj>erty owners,
there were no equalization hearings and tax
statements were not mailed to property
owners. In 1975 separate assessment notices for 1974 and 1975 were mailed to
municipal property owners on August 29,
and the mill levy for both years was established on September 6, 1975. The City held
an equalization hearing on September 30,
and tax statements were mailed to property
owners on October 7. During 1976 the assessment notices apparently were timely
but the mill levy was not established until
June 24 and the tax statements were
mailed on or about July 20.8
On or about July 26, 1977 Ryman paid
under protest $4,430.57 in taxes, which represented his tax liability for the years 1974,
1975, and 1976.9 On July 27, 1977, Ryman
filed a complaint against the City asserting
eleven separate claims for relief.10 Ryman
subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal
of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth claims; the eleventh
claim which was in the nature of a motion
for costs and attorney's fees was reserved
(e) The assessor shall enter the changes
and certify the final assessment roll by June
1.
7. AS 29.53.170(b) reads:
Hie assembly shall annually determine the
rate of levy before June 15. By July I the tax
collector shall mail tax statements setting out
the levy, dates when taxes are payable and
delinquent, and penalties and interest.
The remaining sections of AS 29.53 which set
out procedures for collection of taxes and enforcement of tax liens are not relevant to the
present dispute.
8. The parties disputed the date of the 1976
mailing. Although the defendant's tax statement was postmarked July 20, the City contended that the statements were mailed on
June 30, which would be one day prior to the
statutory deadline. The superior court found
that the date of mailing was probably closer to
the July 20 date alleged by Ryman.
9.

Mr. Ryman owned three parcels of property
against which taxes were levied, as follows:

for post-trial determination by the court.
Thus, of Ryman's original eleven claims for
relief only the sixth and tenth remained as
of the date set for trial. In addition there
were two counterclaims filed by the City:
the first sought penalty and interest
charges allegedly owed by Ryman due to
delinquent payment of city sales taxes, the
second sought costs and attorney's fees incurred by the City in defending the dismissed claims. Ryman's sixth claim, challenging certain conveyances of land by the
City, and the City's counterclaim for sales
taxes were settled by stipulation leaving
Ryman's tenth claim, for refund of property
taxes, for decision by the superior court.11
After a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court entered
judgment in favor of Ryman for the 1974
and 1975 taxes and in favor of the City for
1976. Ryman and the City then filed opposing motions for costs and attorney's fees.
At the hearing on these motions the superior court determined that the litigation involved questions of public interest and
awarded Ryman, who it determined was the
prevailing party, $5,028.98 in costs and $15,000 in attorney fees. The City appealed the
superior court's decision on the 1974 and
1975 taxes and its award of costs and attorney's fees to Ryman. Ryman cross-appealProperty Description

1974

1975

USS288!.Lot61

$129.21

$783 73

USS2881.Lot6

$38.22

$ 2 6 95

$

USS 2881, Lot 81

$262.44

$137.10

$ 437 40

$429.87

SSH7.78

$3.052 92

Total

1976
$2.533 20
82 32

10. In his complaint Ryman charged that the
City also failed to comply with the provisions
of its own local ordinances governing the assessment of property taxes. On appeal, however, the parties have directed their arguments
solely to the effect of the City's noncompliance
with the provisions of the state statutes. Our
discussion of the issues is accordingly limited.
See State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609
P.2d 520, 528 (Alaska 1980). Lewis v. State,
469 P.2d 689, 691-92 (Alaska 1970).
11. The City agreed that its claim for costs and
attorney's fees should be reserved for later determination under Civil Rule 82.
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ed challenging the court's ruling on the
1976 tax and its denial of full attorney's
fees.
The City concedes that in 1974 and 1975 it
failed to meet the deadlines set out in AS
29.53.170(b) for the setting of the mill levy
(June 15) and the mailing of tax statements
(July 1), as provided in AS 29.53.170(b).
The City also admits that in 1976 it failed to
set the mill levy by June 15; there remains
some dispute over whether the City met the
July 1 deadline for mailing tax statements
to property owners. Thus the principal
question presented in this appeal is whether
the property taxes for 1974, 1975, and 1976
are invalid due to the untimeliness of the
City's assessments and levies.
Ryman asserts that the statutory deadlines are mandatory and that strict compliance with them is necessary to make a levy
valid. AS 29.43.020 provides that a first
class city outsjde a borough "must" assess
taxes in accordance with the procedures of
AS 29.53 and AS 29.53.170(b), which stales
that the mill levy "shall" be determined
before June 15 and that tax statements
"shall" be mailed by July 1. Ryman argues
that the language of the statutes evidences
a cleaj- legislative intent to impose mandatory procedural guidelines on the exercise
of taxing powers by first class cities outside
boroughs. The City contends that these
deadlines are directory rather than mandatory and that precise conformity to them is
not a condition precedent to the imposition
of a valid tax. It argues that in order to
invalidate a tax for failure to comply with
the statu lor}' deadlines the aggrieved taxpayer must establish that he was prejudiced
by any delay/
The superior court rejected Flyman's argument that the property taxes were void
unless the City strictly complied with the
statutory deadlines. Although it did not
employ the term "directory", the superior
12. Initially, we note that this controversy is not
resolved simply by asking whether the legislature intended for the locaJ taxing authorities to
follow the prescribed procedures. As the Ore
gon supreme court has stated:
Such an issue cannot be decided by examining whether the legislature "directed" that

court ruled that "substantial compliance"
with the statutory requirements is sufficient to protect taxpayers' rights and to
establish a valid tax. The court concluded
that the City failed substantially to comply
with relevant statutory provisions in 1974
and 1975 and Ryman was thus entitled to a
refund of his tax payments for these years.
The court went on to find that there was
substantial compliance by the City in 1976
and that the 1976 levy therefore was valid.
We begin our analysis with the premise
that the City is obligated to comply with
statutory restrictions on its taxing powers.
This leads us to the question whether anything less than strict compliance with these
"obligatory" statutory' requirements invalidates the resulting tax. To answer this
question we must consider several factors.12
[1] P^irst, where specific time requirements are accompanied by negative words
that signify that the acts shall not be done
at any time other than those designated,
courts are constrained to hold that an assessment may not be made in violation of
the statutory schedule. Anaconda Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 278 Or. 723, 565
P.2d 10S4, 1088 (1977); In Re McLean
Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452,
457 (1972). In this case the terms of AS
29.53.170(b) do not indicate that the specific
dates were intended to IK- absolute limits on
the authority of local taxing officials.
While the statute provides a schedule for
setting the tax rate and mailing tax statements, it does not state that non-compliance
invalidates all subsequent attempts at compliance. In addition, we note that there is
no statement in the applicable statutes regarding the legal effect of noncompliance
by the local taxing body. Therefore, we
conclude that the legislature has not provided a clear signal of its intent with regard to
noncompliance with these statutory deadlines.
the procedure be followed or "mandated" it,
for the issue arises only when the legislative
W'ords make compliance obligatory.
Anaconda

Co v. Dept

of Revenue, 278 Or. 723,

565 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1977)
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[2] Second, statutory requirements designed to protect taxpayers in their dealings
with the taxing authority or to facilitate
taxpayer input into the assessment process
are more likely to be classified as mandatory. An early annotation, after noting that
it was impossible to formulate any universal rules due to the diversity of statutory
provisions, made the following observation:
Generally, however, it may be observed
that where the purpose of the statute is
to protect the taxpayer, the provision as
to the time when an act is to be performed by a tax official or board is ordinarily construed to be mandatory, especially where there are negative words in
the statute that the act shall not be done
at any other time. On the other hand,
where the purpose of the statute is not to
protect the taxpayer, but merely to set up
a guide for the tax officials, a provision
as to the time when an act is to be
performed by a tax official or board is
ordinarily construed to be merely directory, especially where there are no negative
words in the statute that the act shall not
be done at any other time.13
[3] We have held that statutory provisions g6verning the form and duration of
notice to the taxpayer as to his tax liability
or his right to contest the assessment must
be strictly construed; total compliance is
necessary to protect the taxpayer and to
validate the taxing authority's action. Stephens v. Rogers Construction Co., 411 P.2d
205, 207 (Alaska 1966); Johnson v. Miller,
391 P.2d 437, 440-41 (Alaska 1964). In
Stephens we held that the local board's
failure to post the required ten-day notice
of the tax hearing or to establish the date,
mode, and manner of assessment or to publicly equalize property values prior to fixing
the mill levy resulted in an invalid tax.
The reason for these conclusions is that
statutory provisions relating to notice, to
the date, mode and manner of assessment
of taxes, and to the equalization of valuation of property assessed for taxes are
not merely directory in the sense that

they are intended for the guidance of the
Board in the conduct of its business, so as
to secure order, system and dispatch in
the Board's proceedings. Such provisions
are designed for the protection of the
rights of the taxpayer—to apprise him of
the contemplated tax and how and when
it will be assessed, and to give him the
opportunity to be heard as to the tax
obligation that is being imposed upon
him. Provisions of this type are mandatory, and when they are not complied
with the imposition of the tax is invalid
and ineffective.14
[4] Statutory requirements which are
intended to serve primarily as guidelines for
the orderly conduct of public business are
more likely to be considered directory.
Some courts have held that strict compliance is unnecessary where the statutory
provisions establish the schedule for the assessment and levy of taxes, and noncompliance does not affect the taxpayer's right to
contest his tax liability. County of Maricopa v. Garfield, 109 Ariz. 503, 513 P.2d 932,
933 (1973); St Louis County v. State Tax
Comm'n, 529 S.W.2d 384 (Mo.1975); Parker
v. Krick, 433 Pa. 514, 252 A.2d 648, 649
(1969). See also Annot., 151 A.L.R. 248
(1944).

13. Annot., 151 A.L.R. 248, 248 (1944).

14. Stephens, 411 P.2d at 207.

Any effort to apply the analysis outlined
above to the statutory provisions in the
present case, however, is somewhat problematic. While the statutory deadlines for
the assessment and levy of taxes undoubtedly serve to structure and regulate the
internal operations of the taxing authorities, they also serve the interests of taxpayers. Compliance with these deadlines provides timely notice to the taxpayer of his
annual assessment, thereby allowing the
taxpayer to calculate with some degree of
certainty the extent of his tax liability and
to plan his annual financial affairs so as to
meet this obligation. We therefore reject
the notion that these deadlines can be characterized solely as administrative guidelines. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a tax levy is invalid whenever the
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taxing authority has failed to comply strictly with the statutory deadlines. While
there are instances where a substantial delay in the assessment and fixing of taxes or
the mailing of tax statements will seriously
prejudice taxpayers' interests, there are
also instances where minor deviations from
these statutory deadlines will result in little, if any, such prejudice. Rigid adherence
to a rule of strict compliance in all cases
would in our view be unreasonable.
Third and finally, serious practical consequences will follow from characterizing the
statutory deadlines in this case as mandatory. The application of a rule of strict compliance to the statutory deadlines for the
levying of taxes could seriously handicap
the operation of local governments. Any
deviation from the statutory norms, however slight or inadvertent, would automatically invalidate the entire assessment process. A significant source of revenue for
local governments would be forfeited due to
the mistake or dereliction of public officials.
[5, 6] After considering all of the factors described above, we conclude that the
statutory deadlines for the assessment of
taxes, the setting of the mill levy, and the
mailing of tax statements should be construed as directory. Given the lack of negative prohibitions in the statute as to time
of performance, the fact that these deadlines do not govern the right to notice or
the opportunity for a hearing (even though
in some cases they may offer significant
protection to taxpayers' interests), and the
potential adverse impact of a strict compliance rule on local governments, we hold
that the City's failure to meet the statutory
deadlines does not automatically invalidate
its decisions.
Having declined to characterize these
deadlines as mandatory, we must establish
some standard for determining when the
15. See Allen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No 1 of Thurston Cty., 55 Wash 2d 226. 347 P.2d 539, 543
(1959). See also IA CD Sands, Sutherland
Statutory Construction 4th ed § 25 03, p. 299
300 (1972).
16. The substantial compliance test, in our opin
ion, strikes the proper balance between the

failure to comply with a "directory" deadline will invalidate the local taxing authority's action. The City argues that the tax
should be upheld, regardless of the duration
or the extent of the noncompliance, unless
the delay results in prejudice to the taxpayer. According to the City, the burden
should be on the taxpayer to show that the
assessor overvalued the property and that
the noncompliance deprived the taxpayer of
an opportunity to contest his assessment
before the local equalization board.
Sec
Good Development Co. v. Horner, 260
N.W.2d 524, 530 (Iowa 1977).
[7-9] In our view, when the taxpayer
establishes a violation of these "directory"
procedures, the burden should be on the
taxing authority to demonstrate substantial
compliance with the requirements and purposes of the statute. 15 Once a showing of
substantial compliance has been made, the
taxing authority's action will be upheld unless the taxpayer is able to demonstrate
that the noncompliance resulted in substantial prejudice to his interests. Where the
local government's action fails to meet the
substantial compliance test, however, prejudice to the taxpayer will be presumed and
the tax or assessment will be overturned. 16
We n<>w turn to the record in this case.
110J In 1974 the City made no attempt
to comply with the statutory requirements.
Assessment notices and tax statements
were not provided and there were no equalization hearings. The City did not set the
1974 levy until September 1975, and tax
statements were not mailed until October
1975, fifteen months after the statutory
deadline. In light of these delays we agree
with the su;>erior court that there was no
substantial compliance of the City's part
and thus the 1974 tax was invalid as to
Ry man.
interest of taxpayers in having the taxing authority adhere to statutorily-mandated procedures and the interest of the taxing authority
and the general public in not having levies
declared invalid because of the negligence of
the taxing authority's employees.
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In 1975 the City was three months late in
setting the levy and mailing the tax statements to property owners. While this
presents a closer question we conclude that
this delay does not constitute substantial
compliance as a matter of law. As we
indicated previously, the "substantial compliance" rule is intended to allow for minor
delays or disruptions in the assessment procedures. The 90-day delay in this case cannot be characterized as minor, and the City
has failed to offer any justification for it.
We therefore uphold the superior court's
ruling that the 1975 tax was invalid as to
Ryman.
[11] In 1976, the City missed the deadline for setting the mill levy by nine days.
We think that despite this minor delay, the
City substantially complied with the statute. There is some dispute over the precise
mailing date in 1976. Even if we accept
Ryman's date of July 20 we think that the
resulting 20-day delay falls within the
range of substantial compliance. Therefore, the 1976 tax wrill be upheld unless this
delay resulted in some prejudice to Ryman's
interests.
Ryman's sole allegation of prejudice is
that the City's delay in setting the mill levy
caused him to miss the hearing at which the
tax rate was established. He claims that he
would have been able to attend and participate in the levy hearing if it had been held
by the June 15 deadline. As it was, however, he was forced to leave town on business before the City convened the hearing
and set the levy. Ryman charges that he
was deprived of his right to be seen and
heard on the municipal budget and to ascertain his tax liability.
17. The seven abandoned claims involved general challenges to the City's governmental operations. Specifically Ryman alleged that the City
failed to comply with statutory provisions regarding the codification of ordinances, the conduct of city counsel meetings and municipal
elections, the assessment and collection of local
taxes, and the preparation of the budget. In
addition, Ryman claimed the City had discriminatorily zoned a parcel of his property thereby
precluding its development.

[12] We are unpersuaded by Ryman's
claims of prejudice. Several courts have
held that a violation of a taxing provision
does not prejudice the taxpayer's rights unless it deprives him of his right to contest or
appeal the assessment. Good Development
Co. v. Horner, 260 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa
1977); Parker v. Krick, 433 Pa. 514, 252
A.2d 648, 649 (1969). While we are not
adopting this as the sole test of prejudice
we deem it significant that Ryman has not
alleged that he was not given an opportunity to contest his assessment or that the
delay caused him to incur a late charge or
penalty on his taxes. In addition, we note
that Ryman's absence was based in part on
his own decision to pursue his personal business rather than to wait for the convening
of the hearing. While we are cognizant of
Ryman's frustration at the City's untimeliness, we do not think that Ryman has made
a sufficient showing of prejudice to invalidate the 1976 tax.
Civil Rules 54 and 82 provide for the
award of costs and attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. In this case the superior
court determined that Ryman had prevailed
and entered an award of costs and fees in
his favor. The City advances two., arguments in support of its claim that this ruling was erroneous.
[13] First, seven of Ryman's eleven
original claims against the City were abandoned by Ryman in his second amended
complaint because remedial actions taken
by the City had rendered them moot.17 Although these claims technically were dismissed as moot, the City asserts that it
controverted Ryman's allegations as to each
of these claims in its answer to the amended complaint, and implies that Ryman's reRyman's motion for voluntary dismissal of
these claims was not opposed by the City and
was granted by the superior court although the
court stated that the proper procedure for partial dismissal should have been an amendment
under Civil Rule 15(a) rather than a voluntary'
dismissal under Civil Rule 41. The propriety of
this ruling is not at issue in this appeal.
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quest for voluntary dismissal of these
claims was a "de facto" triumph for the
City. Ryman concedes that these claims
were mooted by the City's corrective actions
but argues that the City's remedial measures were made in res[>onse to his lawsuit.
The City contends that it initiated these
corrective steps prior to the filing of Ryman's complaint and denies that Ryman's
law suit was in any way responsible for
them.
The dismissal of a complaint, with or
without prejudice, may justify an award of
attorney's fees to the defendant as the
"prevailing" party. Hart v. Wolff, 489 P.2d
114, 119 (Alaska 1971). Moreover, in granting a motion for voluntary dismissal, after
the merits of the controversy have been put
into issue, the trial court may award costs
and attorney's fees to the defendant. Miller v. Wilkes, 49G P.2d 176, 178 (Alaska
1972). Thus there is precedent for the
City's argument that it "prevailed" on the
dismissed claims. In this case, however, the
claims were dismissed as moot as a result of
the City's corrective actions. Although the
City claims its actions were not prompted
by the litigation, the superior court found
that Ryman's lawsuit provided some impetus for the City's improvement in its operations. Because the City's reaction to Ryman's complaint was at least partly responsible for the claims becoming moot, we conclude that the City has failed to establish
that it prevailed as to thesr claims.
[14] J ^ e x t , the City contends that Ryman did not -prevail on the tax refund
claim. Specifically the City asserts that
although ihe trial court Invalidated the
properjy/tax f°r two. of Lhe three years in
question.^yman'i^Lotal.recovery was less
than one-third of ^the.refund he requested. 18
Ryrrian* contends that the City's emphasis
18. Ryman's lax bill in 1974 was $429 87 as
compared to $947 78 in 1975 and $3,052 92 in
1976. Set supra note 9. Thus Ryman's refund
of the 1974 and 1975 taxes amounted to
$1,377.65, the City retained the 1976 payment

onJiiermGAQtary^award^jnisleading since
it ignores^he^Xa^t^that Ryman's complaint
was also intended to force'the City to comP*y v ^ 1 ^ e »»&!'atutory procedures for assessing pro{>erty taxes.
The determination of the prevailing party
is committed to the trial court's discretion
and will be affirmed on appeal unless it is
shown that the court abused its discretion
by issuing a decision which is arbitrary,
capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly motivated. 19
[T]he prevailingj)arty^tq a s u i t i s . t h e o n e
who^ua^s^uljy^prosecutes the action or
successfully, defends against it, prevailing
on the main issue^even though not to the
extent-ofrthe original contention. ? ,He is
the one in whose favor the decision or
verdict is rendered-and the judgment entered. 20
The main issue in this case was the dispute
over the effect of the City's noncompliance
with the statutory tax procedures. Although the superior court agreed with the
City that the statutory deadlines were directory, it ruled that the City's noncompliance invalidated the property taxes for 1974
and 1975 The fact that Ryman failed to
recover the full refund does not preclude
him from being the prevailing party. TOLK*luk v. Unci, 589 P.2d 873, 876 (Alaska 1979).
Given that Ryman sought to correct the
City's taxing procedures as well as to obtain
a tax refund, we conclude that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ryman was the prevailing partyRyman sought $5,028.9S in costs and $47,640.93 in attorney's fees. The superior
court granted Ryman full costs but limited
his attorney's fees to $15,000. Ryman contends that this award was insufficient and
that he was entitled to full fees under ei19. Tobeluk v. Lind. 589 P.2d 873, 878 (Alaska
1979); Continental Ins. Co v. United States
Fid & Guar. Co, 552 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Alaska
1976).
20.

Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 876 (Alaska
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ther the "public interest" 2 l or "complex
litigation" 2 2 exceptions to Civil Rule 82.
We have held that the purpose of Civil
Rule 82 is to provide partial compensation
to the prevailing party for costs and fees.
Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575,
588, 63 A.L.R.3d 1034 (Alaska 1973).
Where the litigation involves questions of
public interest, however, the prevailing
plaintiff may be entitled to full attorney's
fees.
[T]he successful public interest plaintiff,
acting as a "private attorney general,"
should not be penalized by Rule 82 byfailing to receive full compensation for
the costs of litigating issues of public
importance. We hold, therefore, that the
trial court may, in its discretion, award
full attorney's fees to public interest
plaintiffs. 23
[15] Even though this suit qualifies as
public interest litigation, it does not follow
that Ryman is automatically entitled to full
compensation. As Ryman acknowledges,
the decision is still committed to the trial
court's discretion. While this discretion
may be somewhat narrower than in the
usual Rule 82 context 24 the court is not
bound to award full fees; it may exclude
charges it finds to be unreasonable. In the
present case the superior court found that
the litigation had gotten out of hand and
t h a t both sides had expended unreasonable
amounts of time and energy'. The court
determined that a sum of $15,000 would
have been sufficient for Ryman to present
this case adequately. After reviewing the
record we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing Ryman's
request for full attorney's fees.

Civil Rule 82. Under this doctrine we have
upheld enhanced awards of fees in cases
involving numerous complex issues, extensive time and expense, longer than normal
trials, and unusually large claims or recoveries. Chugach Electric Ass'n v. Northern
Corp., 562 P.2d 1053, 1063-64 (Alaska 1977),
aff'd, 563 R2d 883 (1977); Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 887 (Alaska
1976). In this case most of the claims were
dismissed as moot and the rest were disposed of via summary judgment and stipulation. We do not think the issues were
particularly complex or difficult and the
amounts in controversy were not unusually
large.
[17,18] Finally, the City contends that
the trial court erred in awarding Ryman
$15,000 in attorney's fees because that
award constituted an award of full "reasonable" attorney's fees (i.e., the full fees that
a reasonable attorney would have charged
Ryman for handling this case) and Ryman
did not qualify for an award of full fees
under the "public interest" exception. We
reject this contention. The trial court correctly characterized this case as public interest litigation, and therefore, even if $15,000 did equal full "reasonable" attorney's
fees, the court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding Ryman that sum.
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
COMPTON, J., not participating.

[16] We also reject Ryman's argument
t h a t he was entitled to a higher award
under the "complex litigation" exception to
1979), quoUngi&uzaiytiGolumbia ^Lumber Co.,
3 9 5 ^ 2 a % l i r 5 1 4 (Alaska 1964)

p.2d 883 (Alaska 1977); Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 887 (Alaska 1976).

21. Thomas v. Bailey, 611 P.2d 536, 539 (Alaska
1980); Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986,
993-94 (Alaska 1977).

23. Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986. 993-94
(Alaska 1977).

22. Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. Northern Corp., 562
P.2d 1053, 1063-64 (Alaska 1977), afVd, 563

24. Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 878 n. 11
(Alaska 1979).
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expectedness"
and
"time-definiteness"
factors:
The claimant's development of allergic
contact dermatitis was unexpected, i.e., it
is not recognized as an inherent' hazard
of continued exposure to the chemicals
with which the claimant routinely
worked; his development of allergic contact dermatitis was not gradual, i.e., a
single exposure to the chemical in question triggered the immunological response that created the antibodies, that
are his allergy, no later than seven days
after the single, triggering exposure.
[3] Dr. Ballinger's testimony demonstrates that a tangible happening of a traumatic nature resulted in Mr. Bremer's contact dermatitis, thereby meeting the tests
under § 39-71-119, MCA. We hold that
Mr. Bremer's allergy constituted an injury
within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act, as well as an occupational
disease within the meaning of the Occupational Disease Act, so that he could elect
his remedy between the Acts. The judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court
is affirmed.
TURNAGE, C.J., and SHEEHY, MORRISON, GULBRANDSON and HUNT, JJ.,
concur.

Vernon HOVEN, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
William F. AMRINE and Larry
Vervick, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 86-330.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs Sept. 25, 1986.

notices on buyers for failure to pay for
stock they had purchased. The District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Missoula
County, James B. Wheelis, J., issued p r e
liminary injunction against buyers restraining them from taking any action which
might negatively affect value of corporation or its stock. Buyers filed motion to
modify preliminary injunction in order to
allow sale of corporate asset. Trial court
ruled default notices were valid and awarded seller1 attorney fees. Buyers appealed.
The Supreme Court, Sheehy, J., held that:
(1) modification of preliminary injunction
was necessary in order to allow corporation's operations to continue and injunction
was necessary to prevent buyers from dissipating assets of corporation, and thus seller was entitled to attorney fees in connection with modification hearing, and (2)
award of attorney fees was not abuse of
discretion, even though seller could have
avoided modification hearing by stipulating
to sale of asset.
Affirmed.

1. Costs <s=172
Preliminary
injunction,
restraining
stock purchase agreement buyers from taking any action which might negatively affect value of corporation or its stock, and
hearing to modify that injunction, in order
to allow sale of corporate asset to permit
corporation's operations to continue, were
one facet of the litigation whose main issues were validity of default notices served
by stock purchase agreement seller and
breach of contract; therefore, stock purchase agreement provision, granting attorney fees in event lawsuit was brought to
enforce any agreement provisions, entitled
seller as prevailing party to attorney fees
incurred in connection with hearing on
modification of preliminary injunction.

Decided Oct. 30, 1986.
2. CosU «=>32(2)
Buyers and seller entered into stock
purchase agreement. Seller served default

The "prevailing party," for purposes of
determining award of costs, is party who

534

Mont.

727 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d S E R I E S

has affirmative judgment rendered in his
or her favor at conclusion of entire action.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Costs <e^l72
It was not abuse of discretion to award
attorney fees, pursuant to stock purchase
agreement provision, to seller for expenses
incurred in hearing to modify preliminary
injunction, even though seller could have
avoided such expenses by stipulation in-"
stead of enforcing petition for modification;
seller was prevailing party on action's main
issues and seller's failure to stipulate was
not necessarily unreasonable in adversarial
setting where seller and buyers were unable to reach agreement.
Lawrence F. Daly, Garlington, Lohn &
Robinson, Missoula, for defendants and appellants.
Christopher B. Swartley, Datsopoulos,
MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, for plaintiff
and respondent.
SHEEHY, Justice.
William Amrine and Larry Vervick appeal from a judgment of the District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County,
awarding attorney fees to Vernon Hoven.
We affirm the District Court's award.
Hoven, Amrine and Vervick were equal
shareholders in the Missoula accounting
firm of Hoven, Vervick & Amrine. In July,
1979, Amrine and Vervick entered into an
agreement to purchase stock from Hoven.
The agreement provided for the award of
attorney fees in the event a lawsuit was
brought to enforce any of the provisions of
the agreement.
In June, 1985, Hoven served default notices on Amrine and Vervick for failing to
pay for the stock they had purchased.
Vervick and Amrine then brought suit in
the District Court to have the notices declared void. Hoven responded with a suit
against Amrine and Vervick seeking an
injunction and damages. The District
Court consolidated the two cases, and after

a show cause hearing on June 25, 1985,
issued a preliminary injunction against Amrine and Vervick, restraining them from
taking any action which might negatively
affect the value of the corporation or its
stock.
Amrine and Vervick continued to manage
the day-to-day business of the corporation.
In August, 1985, the corporation experienced cash flow problems and was unable
to meet certain obligations, including state
a n d , federal payroll taxes. Amrine and
Vervick, through their attorney, attempted
to contact Hoven, in order to obtain a stipulation for the $ale of a corporate asset to
raise money. Their attorney was unable to
elicit a response from Hoven's attorney,
and they finally filed a motion to modify
the preliminary injunction. A hearing on
this motion was held August 30, 1985. At
the hearing, Hoven testified he had no substantive objections to the sale. The District Court granted the first two paragraphs of Amrine and Vervick's petition
for modification, deferring action on the
remaining three issues.
In October, 1985, the District Court ruled
that the default notices were valid, and
that Hoven was entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to the stock purchase
agreement. In November, the court held a
hearing to set the attorney fee award. Hoven was awarded fees for all attorney services between June 14 and July 9, 1985.
The court reserved ruling on which party
was entitled to recover fees for the period
after July 9, 1985. Finally, in April, 1986,
the District Court granted Hoven attorney
fees for the post-July 9 period, and denied
Amrine and Vervick's request for the
same.
Amrine and Vervick raise two issues on
appeal: Whether Hoven was entitled to an
award of attorney fees for the postJuly 9
period, and if so, whether those fees were
reasonable? Additionally, respondent Hoven requests attorney fees for this appeal.
Attorney fees are allowed when they are
provided for by statute or^ contractual provision. Jordan v. Elizabethan
Manor
(1979), 181 Mont. 424, 434, 593 P.2d 1049,
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1055. In this case, the stock purchase
agreement had a clause which provided:
a. Attorney Fees. In the event suit is
brought to enforce any of the provisions
of this agreement, the prevailing parties
shall be entitled to costs of suit and any
appeals thereon, including reasonable attorney's fees.
[1] Amrine and Vervick argue that the
attorney fees awarded for the August 30
hearing for modification of the preliminary'
injunction do not fall under the contract
provision cited above. They argue that the
modification of the injunction to allow sale
of a corporate asset has nothing Vy do with
enforcement of the provisions of the stock
purchase agreement.
We disagree. The main issues before
the District Court were whether or not the
stock purchase agreement had been breached by the failure of Amrine and Vervick to
tender payment to Hoven, and whether the
default notices were valid. These were
complex issues which the court ultimately
decided in favor of Hoven in October, 1985.
In the interim, while the court was resolving the issues, a temporary injunction was
necessary to prevent Amrine and Vervick
from dissipating the assets of the corporation. The August 30 modification of the
injunction was necessary in order to allow
the corporation's operations to continue.
We find, as did the District Court, that the
injunction and its modification were one
facet of the litigation whose main issues
were the validity of the default notices and
breach of contract.
[2] A i r Theparty«who prevails on the main
issue of a case'is-entitled to costs. Medhus
v. Duttcr (1979), 184 Mont. 437, 447, 603
P.2d 669, 674.-K-Arpre vailing-party is one
who has a n affirmative judgment rendered
in his or her'favor at the conclusion of the
entire case. Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor, 181 Mont, at 434, 593 P.2d at 1055.
Medhus concerned costs under §§ 25-10101 and 2S-1O-102, MCA, while Jordan
related to attorney fees by contract. The
interpretation in these cases of "prevailing
party" is applicable here. The District
Court found that Amrine and Vervick were
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not prevailing parties; not only did Hoven
prevail on the main issues of the case, but
the court granted only two of the five
requests made in Amrine and Vervick's
petition to modify. The court's award of
attorney fees in this case wa. proper.
[3] Amrine and Vervick's second argument is that the attorney fees incurred by
Hoven are unreasonable since those fees
would not have been incurred if Hoven had
stipulated to the sale of the asset rather
than force them to petition the court for a
modification of the injunction. The District
Court found that where parties are able to
stipulate to an issue, matters may be more
quickly resolved—but that the failure to
stipulate to an issue is not necessarily unreasonable in an adversarial setting where
the parties are unable to reach an agreement. The court found that by participating in the hearing, whether or not it was
reasonable or necessary, both parties incurred expenses and attorney fees.
We hold the District Court did not abuse
its discretion by awarding attorney fees to
Hoven, including those incurred by his attorney from the August 30 hearing. The
District Court awarded attorney fees to the
party prevailing on the main issues of the
case. It is not reasonable to require the
District Court to keep a running tally of
"points scored" by each side in order to
ap^K)rtion costs and attorney fees at the
end of every lawsuit. Our adoption of the
prevailing party rule in Medhus v. Duttcr,
svj>raf obviates that requirement.
Order of the District Court is affirmed,
and the cause remanded for determination
of respondent's costs and attorney fees for
this appeal.
TURNAGE, C.J., and MORRISON, GULr
BRANDSON and WEBER, JJ., concur.

(O

I M* KUMMI

SrSH*)

BUZA v. C O L U M N LUMBER COMPANY

Alaska

5H

Cite as, A i a s k a | 395 P 2 d 511

Waiter BUZA and At Buza, Appellants,
v.
COLUMBIA LUMBER COMPANY of Ata$ k a f

a corporation, Appellee.
No. 453.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Oct 2, 1904.

counterclaim dismissed with prejudice, even
though plaintWWclTioT^
of reliel*it"had-T>raye<i*iorf*it*was,4tioTietheless^he^-only^prevailing^party'^^and was
entitied*to,costs. AS 09.60.010; Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 54(d), 82(a) (1, 2).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Costs <S=>32(2)

Action for conversion of logs, f h e
"Prevailing j>arty" r is^party*< which j s
Superior Court, Third Judicial District, }} u _ prcdominanfc-*n4awsuit and i$ one_ who sucbert A. Gilbert, J., entered judgment for cessful!y^rosecutcs-»action„.or ar success fully
plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Su- defends againgfcjj^p rev ailing on main issue,
preme Court, Arcnd, A. J., held that w h c r c even thoughoioUto extent of original condefendant disregarded in three specifica_ tention and is'one in whose-favor .decision
tibns of error (he ptzin requirements of Su- or verdict is rendered and judgment entered.
preme. Court Rule as to contents of br| e f t
6. Costs <£=>!84(7)
court would not consider errors char^ e d
In view of decision that plaintiff owned
and that where plaintiff was the only p r e .
"six bundles of spruce logs, witnesses, one
vailing party, it was entitled to cost.
of whose testimony indicated that defendAffirmed.
ants had actually taken the logs and another witness whose testimony indicated
that plaintiff had had good title to them, al1. Appeal and Error €=>758(3)
Specification of error stating that t w 0 lowance of witness' costs with respect to
numbered instructions were wrong and t^ a t such witnesses was not improper on basis
other instructions should have been giv e n that they testified only as to plaintiff's damdid not comply with rule of Supreme Co\ ir t age claim for which no recovery had been
requiring that specifications of error shall granted.
set out each error separately.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>758(3)

Specification of error that lower co ur £
ought to have allowed certain memorandum
violated rule as to contents of brief, wh^ r c
substance of memorandum was not set fo^th
and grounds on which memorandum's ^ J .
• mission was »urged -were -not -stated? S>u_
preme Court Rules, rule 11(a) (6).
3. Appeal and Error <§=>766

Whcrc appellant disregarded in t h r c c
specifications of error the plain requii-c_
ments of Supreme Court Rule as to contcr^s
of brief, court would not consider crrc, rs
charged. Supreme Court Rules, rule l l ( a )
J»)
4. Costs <S=>32(3)

Where judgment was entered for plai n .
tiff, declaring it to be owner of pcrsor ta i
property covered by lawsuit and ordering

Albert Maffei, Anchorage, for appellants.
G. F. Boney and L. S. Kurtz, Jr., of Burr,
Boney 8c Pease, Anchorage, for appellee.
Before N E S B E T T , C. J., and DIMOND
and AREND, JJ.
AREND, Justice*.
..This appeal -is-brought to-review-the decision in the court below concerning the
ownership of six bundles of spruce logs
designated as Carlson Raft No. 7 and valued
at about $8,000.
In a complaint, filed on July 20, 1962, the
plaintiff-appellee, Columbia Lumber Company, hereinafter referred to as Columbia,
accused the defendants-appellants of converting the logs, willfully trespassing upon
Columbia's property and interfering with
its mill operations. For relief Columbia
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prayed for the r e t u r n of the logs and for
c o m p e n s a t o r y and punitive d a m a g e s totaling
$31,00a 1
In a n s w e r to the complaint, t h e appellants
alleged t h a t the logs w e r e the property of
the appellant, Al Buza, w h o had purchased
them from one Boyd Carlson by bill of sale ;
denied that they had converted the logs o r
that they h a d trespassed upon or d a m a g e d
Columbia's p r o p e r t y ; a n d admitted the
value of t h e logs to be $8,000. By way of
counterclaim the appellants alleged that Al
B u z a w a s the o w n e r of the l o g s , t h a t
Columbia h a d wrongfully taken them from
Patton B a y to W h i t t i c r , Alaska, to Al
Buza's d a m a g e in the sum of $7,500; and
that Al B u z a was entitled to recover the
logs or t h e i r value.
Columbia filed a reply to the counterclaim in which it denied all of the allegations of the counterclaim except for admitting the value of the logs to be $8,000,
and that it had taken the logs from P a t t o n
Bay to W h i t t i c r but not wrongfully.
T h e case was tried to a j u r y which returned a verdict for Columbia.
By its
verdict the j u r y found that Columbia w a s
the owner of the logs and entitled to their
possession but that it was not entitled to recover any d a m a g e s . J u d g m e n t was entered
mi the verdict and the appellants filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. T h e
j u d g m e n t included an a w a r d of an a t t o r ney's fee to Columbia for $1,250. L a t e r the
trial court entered a " C o r r e c t e d J u d g m e n t
on General V e r d i c t " a w a r d i n g to Columbia
an a t t o r n e y ' s fee in the amount stated and
its costs of suit to be taxed by the clerk in
thc_amount of $1,302.10. Notice of appeal
to this court was filed by the appellants on
December 2, 1963. Nine days later an a p peal w a s taken to the superior court from
the clerk's ruling on costs and o n . December 17, 1963, the superior court declared that
the clerk's cost bill of $1,302.10 would stand.
I. In the -event' that the loss could not be
recovered, Columbia demanded judgment
for their value ($3,000), $1,000 for darangc to its log boom, $5,000 for diverting
the nctivitic9 of employees at the mill
and punitive damages lor the wrongful

T h e appellants h a v e listed five s p e d
tions of e r r o r , all of which h a v e been
tacked by Columbia on the g r o u n d s that •
fail to comply with the following rcqi
m e n t s of S u p r e m e Court Rule 11(a)
"(a)
* * * [Appellant's] bri<
shall contain * * *

*

*

*

*

*

*

" ( 6 ) A specification of e r r o r s reli<
upon which shall be numbered and sh;
set out separately and particularly ea<
e r r o r intended to be u r g e d . W h e n tl
e r r o r alleged is to the admission or r
jection of evidence, t h e specifkati(
shall quote the g r o u n d s u r g e d at tl
trial for the objection and the full su
stance of the evidence admitted o r r
jectcd, and refer to the p a g e n u m b
in the t r a n s c r i p t as contained in tl
record on appeal where t h e same m;
be found. W h e n the e r r o r alleged is
the c h a r g e of the court, t h e specific
tion shall set out the p a r t refcrrto verbatim, w h e t h e r it be in instru
tions given or in instructions refuse
together with the g r o u n d s of the o
jeetions u r g e d at the trial.
\Vh«
findings arc specified as e r r o r , the spc<
fication shall state as particularly
may be w h e r e i n the findings of fact ai
conclusions of law a r e alleged to be c
roneous. * * * "
W e a g r e e with Columbia as t o the
t h r e e e r r o r s specified. T h e s e w e r e :
1) T h a t the lower court e r r e d in givh
instructions to j u r y p a r t i c u l a r l y i
struction N o . 17 and i n s t r u c t i o n N o .
and for the courts [sic] failure to gi
instructions encompassing the folio*
ing s t a t u t e s : 29-1-71 and 2 9 - 1 A C L A 1949.
2) T h a t t h e following portion of i
struction N o . 17 was e r r o n e o u s : "if t
j u r y finds t h a t the logs w e r e left in t
nets of the appellants in the amount
$25,000. Columbia regained possc*su
of the logs in question through the sta
police several days after the complai
was filed.

BUZA v. COLUMBIA LUMBER COMPANY
Cite as, Alaska, 395 P.2d 511
possession of seller Carlson who, in
turn, sold them to plaintiff for value
received and caused them to be delivered to plaintiffs sawmill at Whitticr, Alaska without informing plaintiff
that said logs were the property of the
defendants, if indeed they were, then
you must find plaintiff to be the owner
of the logs and render a verdict for
said plaintiff/'
(emphasis added).
3) That the lower court ought to have
allowed as evidence that certain memorandum made by appellant, AL BUZA,
at the time he had a conversation with
Mr. Morgan, President of appellee,
COLUMBIA LUMBER COMPANY,
which memorandum was made at the
time of the conversation in July, 1962.
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in the lower court or the nature of the objection at the time, if objection was made.
[2] The third specification of error violates Rule 11(a) (6) in two respects: (1)
The substance of the memorandum alleged
to have been erroneously excluded is not
set forth; and (2) the grounds on which
the memorandum's admission was urged is
not stated in the specification.
[3] Since the appellants have disregarded the plain requirements of Supreme Court
Rule 11(a) (6), which has been in effect
now for nearly five years and the observance
of which has been urged upon the bar in
a number of our decisions, 2 we need not
consider the first three errors charged. 3

[1] Comparing these three specifications
of error with the requirements of Supreme
Court Rule 11(a) (6) we find a woeful lack
of compliance on the part of the appellants.
The first specification actually specifies
three errors: That instruction 17 was
wrong; that instruction 19 was wrong;
and that other instructions should have
been given. Furthermore, it does not set
forth the instructions claimed to have been
erroneously refused; and it docs not state
the grounds of objection urged at the trial.

The other two errors specified by the appellants relate to the allowance of costs
to Columbia and are set forth in the margin. 4 With respect to the issues raised by
these specifications of error, the appellants
contend that Columbia was not the prevailing party since it did not recover the full
amount of the relief prayed for and, therefore, was not entitled to costs; or, in the
alternative, if Columbia was entitled to
costs, it should not have been allowed costs
for the transportation and witness fees of
witnesses whose testimony produced no verdict by the jury.

Specification of error No. 2 likewise fails
to set forth the grounds of objection urged
at the trial. Without searching the record
ourselves, we do not know whether the appellants even voiced any objections to instruction No. 17 in the court below. Nor
do the appellants state anywhere in their
liricf that they objected "to the instruction

AS 09.60.010 states: ''Except as otherwise provided by statute, the supreme court
shall determine by rule or order what costs,
if any, including attorney fees, shall be
allowed the prcvialing party in any case."
Civil Rule 54(d) provides that "costs shall
be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs."

2. Preferred Gen. Agency of Alaskn, Inc.
v. RafTctto, Opinion No. 214, 391 P.2d
931, 053 (Alaska 19J>D; Crumc v.
Crumc, 37S P.2d 183, 1S4-185 (Alaska
1003); McLcmoro v. Harris, 374 P.2d
410 (Alaska 1DG2); Parks v. Brown,
3G8 P.2d 220 (Alaska 19G2); Bidwell v.
Scheclc, 355 P.2d 581, 5S7-588 (Alaska
1900).

4. The appellants' last two specifications
of error allege:
."4) That the appellee [Columbia] was
not the prevailing party nnd, therefore,
not entitled to costs as provided by
Section 00 GO 010 Alaska Statutes.
"5) That the lower court erred in
affirming the clerk's decision on costs
and particularly to the costs awarded for
travel and witness fees for Gifford Evans
and Thomas A. Morgan and that insofar
as their testimony was concerned the
jury returned a verdict not in plaintiff's
(appellee's) favor."

3. Crume v. Crumc, supra note 2, 378 P.2d
at 185.

395 P.2d—33
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Civil Rule 8 2 ( a ) (1) sets forth a schedule
of fees which is to be applied for any party
recovering a m o n e y j u d g m e n t and is followed by 8 2 ( a ) (2) which s t a t e s : " I n actions w h e r e the money j u d g m e n t is not an
accurate criteria for d e t e r m i n i n g the fee to
be allowed to the prevailing side, the court
shall a w a r d a fee c o m m e n s u r a t e with the
amount and value of legal services rendered."
[ 4 ] It is true that Columbia did not recover the full m e a s u r e of the relief it had
prayed for but it w a s nonetheless the prevailing party and the only prevailing party.
J u d g m e n t w a s entered for Columbia, declaring it to be the o w n e r "of the personal
property cohered by th<s fawsak " aad ordering the appellants' c o u n t e r c l a i m dismissed
with prejudice.
[5] T h e dictionary states t h a t " P R E V A I L I N G applies esp. to that which is pred o m i n a n t , " 0 and it h a s been established by
case law that the prevailing p a r t y to a suit
is the one w h o successfully prosecutes the
action or successfully defends against it,
prevailing on the main issue, c v e n n h o u g h
not to the extent of the original contention. 6
H e is~the onc*in*whose f a v o r the decision
or verdicl i s ^ r e n d c r e d ^ n d ^ t h e j u d g m e n t
entered. 7

used to s h o w t h a t the appellants actually
took the log's d e s i g n a t e d Carlson's R a f t No.
7.
By M o r g a n ' s testimony,
Columbia
b r o u g h t out t h a t t h e logs intended for the
appellants (not C a r l s o n ' s Raft N o . 7) were
ready and available for them to pick up at
P a t t o n Bay all d u r i n g the time of the dispute
between t h e p a r t i e s . H i s testimony also
tended to establish the fact that Columbia
w a s a bona fide p u r c h a s e r ; for value of the
logs in Carlson R a f t N o . 7 and hence had
good title t o them.
W e find n o e r r o r in the allowance of costs
to Columbia, inclusive of the a t t o r n e y fees.
N o r do we find any abuse of its discretion
by the trial court in affirming t h e clerk's
award of costs.
J u d g m e n t affirmed.

O

j M T H U H I l l JTSKH

A P E X C O N C R E T E CO., Inc., Appellant,

v.
Max E. B R A Y , Appellee.

No. 438.

[6] As to the other point on costs, the
Supreme Court of Alaska.
appellants claim that GifTord E v a n s , the
Oct. 1, 19C4.
superintendent of Columbia's o p e r a t i o n s
at Whittier, and T h o m a s M o r g a n , president
of Columbia, testified only as to Columbia's
Salary claim by f o r m e r
employee
d a m a g e claim of $31,000, for which no rcagainst c o r p o r a t e employer. F r o m an adc<?r<rrj' ir<?s gr<?r?tcd /// A V //-/<?) c&s/rt.
T///S versc judgment
of the Superior
Court,
being so, they contend that no witness costs
T h i r d Judicial District, E d w a r d V . -Davis,
should have been allowed for E v a n s or
J., the c o r p o r a t i o n appealetl _ T h c S u p r e m e
M o r g a n . Looking to the record, however,
Court, A r c n d , A. J., held that trial judge
we note that E v a n s ' testimony was also
had not p r e j u d g e d the case and that his
5. Webster's New International JV'tmnnry
(2d cd. unnbr. 19G0).
6. nines v. Pcrcr, 242 F.2<1 450, 4C>G (Oih
Cir. 1957) ; Atwood v. Kleberg, 1G3 F.
2d JOS. 115 (5lh Cir.), cert, denied, 332
•U.S. 843, 68 S.Ct. 207, 2GS, 92 L.Ed.
414 (1947); Huggins v. nil], 23G S.W.
1054, 1055 (Mo.1921); Dixon v. Scboonover, 22G Or. 443, 359 P.2d 115, 120,
modified, 22G Or. 443, 300 l\2d 274

(1961);

B a l d w i n v. Alborti, ? « W . ^ l i 2d

243. 3G2 P.2d 25S. 201 (1001)"." Contrn.
United States for Use and Benefit of
Miller & BcnUej Equipment Co \ Kelly, 192 F.Supp. 274 (D.AJuska 19G1).
7. Ihinnc v. New York Tel. Co., 107 Misc.
439, 17G N.Y.S. 519 (Sup.Ct.1019); Ennis v. King, 50 Wash.2d 405, 341 P.2d
8S5, 353 P.2d 950, 954 (19G0).
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Herbert O. TRAYNER, an individual, and
Trayner Investments C o r p o r a t i o n , a
Utah corporation, Plaintiffs and Respondents.
v.
Robeil CUSHING, a n individual.
Defendant a n d Appellant.
No. 18732.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 7, 1984.
Builder brought action against purchaser for sums allegedly remaining due on
a contract for the construction and pur
chase of a home, and purchaser counterclaimed for costs of repairs due to faulty
workmanship. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Philip R. Fishier, J.,
awarded builder value of certain extras
provided to purchaser, but reduced the
award by cost of repairs necessitated by
faulty workmanship, and awarded builder
attorney fees, and purchaser appealed the
award of attorney fees.
The Supreme
Court held that both parlies were entitled
to attorney fees p u r s u a n t to the contract,
where each had rights under the agreement that were denied by the other, each
was required to lake legal action to enforce
the agreement in one or more particulars,
and each was successful on one or more:
nomts and unsuccessful on others
Reversed and remanded.
1. Appeal and E r r o r <£=-*! 69
Issues not presented to the trial court
for decision are not reviewable on appeal.
2. Appeal and E r r o r <S=>170<1)
Issue of whether provision of written
agreement for construction and sale of a
home that party failing to fulfill its obligations under ihe agreement w o o l ! pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing the agreement applied to ark oral amendment of the
agreement was not preserved lor revi«*v» on
appeal, '//here the issue was raised for first
time on appeal.

.1. Costs <3=>172
Where the parties have agreed by con
tract to the payment of attorney fees, court
may award reasonable fees in accordance
with terms of the parties' agreement.
4. Costs <s=»172
Amount of attorney fees to be award
ed pursuant to a contract provision for
payment of attorney fees is largely within
sound discretion of trial court, but factors
which should be considered include relationship of the fee to amount recovered,
novelty and difficulty of issues involved,
overall result achieved and necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights under
the contract.
5. Costs e=»172
A party entitled to attorney fees purs u a n t to provisions of a contract is entitled
only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights
within terms of the agreement.
C». Costs <s=>172
Roth builder and purchaser of a home
were entitled to award of attorney fees
pursuant to their a g r e e m e n t for construction and sale of the home, which provided
that either party failing to carry out terms
specified in the agreement, would pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing the agreement, where each of the parties ha J rights
under the agreement t h a t were denied by
the other, each was required to. take legal
action to enforce the a g r e e m e n t in one or
more particular, and each was successful
on one or more points and unsuccessful on
others; however, each was entitled to attorney fees only for time spent in enforcing
rights under the contract and not for time
spent on other matters not covered under
the contract.

Lrant. H. Wail, Salt Lake City, for <Je
feraiant and appellant.
James A. Boevers, Gordon Straehan, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
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tiffs.
Defendant challenges only
award of attorney fees on appeal.

PKR CURIAM.

sale was written or. a standard form earnest money agreement and offer to pur
rliii.s". t u t it was modified by oral agree
ment that " e x t r a s " would be provided as
requested by defendant and c h a r e d at the
c o n t r a c t o r ^ (plaintiffs) cost. The house
was completed anu the sale closed. At the
closing, the price agreed under the written
contract was paid. The parties could not
a g r e e with respect to the price of the extri.s, ImwcviT, ai:;! that n mount was not
,>:t..l.
Plaintiffs
brought
action,
claiming
$9,leM~? for the extras and, in addition,
claiming that the $2,500 e a r n e s t money
was never paid, though they had acknowledged receipt of that amount by signing
the earnest money receipt and again by
signing the closing statements
Defendant answered, alleging t h a t plaintiffs had overcharged him in his claim for
the extras, but admitting that he owed
plaintiffs $2,990 He denied that the earnest money had not been paid, and he counter<'la;med for $2,250 for repairs due to
fau'tv workmanship on th e part of plaintifts.
The trial court, sitting without a jury.
f./uri'l that plaintiffs had net carried their
b.ird"n of proving that the earnest moooy
n.i i :."t been paid arid denied judgment f»>r
that amount. The court further found thai
plaintiffs had overcharged defendant J or
the extra work by charging the retail price
of electrical fixtures unreduced h> the contractor's discounts and by fading to give
defendant credit for returned items. In
addition, the court granted defendant dam;i)'.'.1 d*r lepairs i.ece^sita!. d by faulty
workmanship on the par! of plaintiff.*..

the

The written earnest money a g r e e m e n t
and offer to purchase, signed by both partie.,, provides:
We do hereby agree to carry out and
fulfill the terms specified above . . . . If
either party fails to do so, he agrees to
pay all expenses of enforcing this agreement, or any right arising out of breach
thereof, including attorney's fees.
Defeiidan! first contends that this provi
sioi. of the written agreement does not
apply to the oral amendment of the contract. He reasons that because plaintift:
recovered judgment only for the extras
provided by the oral contract, they wore
not entitled to an award of attorney fees>
under our rule that such fees are awarded
only if there is a contractual or statutory
liability therefor.'
f l , 2 | Defendant raises this point for
the first turn on appeal
He did not
pre-.-cnt to the -trial court the question of
whether the oral agreement was a separate
contract or a modification of the written
agreement
In fact, the case was tried by
both parties upon the assumption that the
oral agreement was a modification of tne
written agreement and was therefore a
part of n. Issues- not presented to the trial
court for decision are not reviewable by
this CoU't.-' and we express no opinion on
t h e l;-»sue.

rather than, plaintiffs, is entitled to an
award of attorney fr"s under the theories'
',1) that pla.ntiff^ breached the contract by
charging retail price for some items rather
than contractor's eo>t, as agreed; atfftSTS'
t~2*$*»n^£u; ^^t«Kie#auteri^a4xi^t£h^»^ fkla^

^ttXL&^^'JJkf&Ai&is

Th.-

.-.eirt

a!...

t*t»j^L j*_- .j%vjfor£ i> v» -1' **. H '-jus v. nttri * (m d/u • -

a.' a i d e d .ittnrne;* fee*, of $2,owo t.» j>lan.
I.

//.

I i . h

ft,

• L.

t '

I'

le"

f f'77).
M -7',)

7.

V ,\>*,i

1

Srx\'fn,j>i.

t it -i * t
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I' V
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[3-5] Where the parties have agreed by
contract to the payment of attorney (v.es,
the court may award reasonable fees in
accordance with the terms of the parties'
agreement. 1 The amount to be awarded is
largely within the sound discretion of the
trial court, 4 but such factors should be
considered as the relationship of the fee to
the amount recovered, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall
result achieved and the necessity of initiatii'ii; a lawsuit to vindicate rights under the
contract. 5 In addition, a party is entitled
only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights
within the terms of their agreement.*'
16 J ^^0^::^^-.-^tffrrjiaftipi
jctoe and
;i^i^Karf«Bt^^wAr4:n^att04^ey fees to tin
''piwwiui^fHuAy'v^^
party "not m
doiaMkfc&^JkidtUter «f -"the*e* f*hrawRs was
k4a»»^Ja. 4A»C, screentvut before; u». These
parties hMe£*groed instead to tht» payment
of•+tot*nMa&^iHHh.-i&~jm

action

jbrought to

"t^HMiiprt^'thf ^r*«nrwH«t^*m- any right
urtarw^ront Qt breach iMPWf/*? The qm s
tiWt before ***e intd e w r t w a s : winch party
V&ifofesd^the agreement a^amst the othi^T~ Each of these parties had rights under
the agreement that were denied him by the
other. Kach was required to take legal
action to enforce the agreement in on** or
morv particulars. Kach was successful on
one or more points and unsuccessful on
3.

others. Each was therefore entitled to an
award of attorney fees for successfully
enforcing the agreement against the other.
At trial, defendant suggested that both
parties might be entitled to attorney fees,
depending upon the court's resolution of
the issues, but the judge stated he was of
the opinion that fees should go only to the
prevailing party.
The court therefore
awarded fees only to plaintiffs since the
net judgment was in their favor. The
court was in error in making this award,
b<>th in failing to recognize that some part
of the time charged by plaintiffs' attorney
was spe?it in defending the counterclaim on
which* he was not successful and in failing
to award defendant any fees for enforcing
his rights under the contract.
The award of attorney fees is reversed,
.and this case is remanded to the district
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs to defendant. 7
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.
f

O c *t y "U*»l* i W i n
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4.

Id

5.

Id
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mortgage und not lot the c i c k n s . ' ol «« cotsniciclaim (>n w h a n r;<n^r of ..< Oor, MO aj'.rccm. n(
foi !).i\nicri: >A a o o r n c v Ices had liccn in;u!c,
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Gem I . i l l u m e d an a w a i d io d e f e n d a n t for fees
a t t r i b u t a b l e to t u n c spent in defence of plainlist':, c o m p l a i n t , but am ecu with the m a l c o u r t
that d e f e n d a n t w a s not entitled to fees attributable to p u r s u i n g a i o u o l c i i latin on which he w a s
not successful.
7.

No a w a r d of a t l o r n e v fees for p r o s e c u t i n g o r
d e f e n d i n g this a p p e a l is m a d e since d e f e n d a n t ,
J he successful p a r t y o n a p p e a l , has not request
cd such a n a w a r d . Sde Mutiagemem
Services v.
l)e\t>L.>pfn<'nt As>oc. Utah. 617 P.2d 406 (1980).
in v\hich this C o u r t held thai a t t o r n e y fees on
app-'al m a v be a w a i ded w h e r e there is a con11 .K tual o b l i g a t i o n tnei d o r .
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'Washington for the proper performance of
his contract for the purchase of the timber herein involved, and the said Owner is
wholly an independent operator and not an
agent of the Buyer, and will hold the Buyer
harmless from any claims for labor or
other charges or expenses that may become
a lien against these logs, this being solely
the purchase and sale of logs.
"IV.
"It is contemplated that the Buyer will
advance to the Owner all sums necessary
to promptly pay for all stumpage due
from the Owner on said lands and will likewise advance on the purchase price of these
logs from time to time such amounts as is
reasonably necessary to carry out the logging operations; Provided only, that said
advances shall in no event exceed the purchase price of said logs as herein agreed
upon.
"V.
"The Buyer shall at all times have the
right to examine the books of the Owner
to the extent reasonably necessary to determine the fact that all logs purchased
by the Buyer are free from any liens for
stumpage, labor, or any other charges that
might arise against the Buyer, and should
at any time the said charges exceed the
actual purchase price of these logs, then the
Buyer at its option may take possession of
the said timber tracts and log the same
paying to the State the sum due for stumpage for the timber removed.
"VI.
"The Owner has been delivering logs
from the lands herein described since approximately May 10, 1955, and has delivered to date approximately two and onehalf million feet. Prior to the first delivery
of logs the Buyer advanced to the Owner
the sum of $16,009.60 on or about the 5th
day of April, 1955. Since the delivery of
logs has started the Buyer has advanced on
tht^ purchase price of the logs $114,338.14.
"VII.
"It is now mutually agreed that the full
purchase price of the logs already delivered

together with the logs hereafter to be delivered shall all be determined under the price
formula as set forth herein. The advance
of $16,009.60 made on the 5th day of April,
1955, shall be prorated over the full purchase price of all of the logs now bought
under this contract by aljotting $2.00
per M feet to all logs delivered including those heretofore delivered as well as
those hereafter delivered under this contract, until the full $16,009.60 prepayment
shall have been fully liquidated.
"Dated this 29th day of July, 1955.
"Joe Daman
"Owner
"Walton Lumber Company,
a corporation,
"By
Clyde Walton
"Buyer"
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Thomas A. D A W S O N , Respondent,
v.
William J. S H E A R E R and Marjorle Ann
Shearer, his wife, Appellants.
No. 34743.

Supreme Court of Washington,
Department 2.
March 26, 1059.
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1950.
Action to recover for the balance due
on construction of a house. Judgment for
the plaintiff in the Superior Court, King
County, Story Birdseye, J., and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Foster.
J., held that the evidence sustained the
judgment for the plaintiff, that parol evidence was admjjsit^le,. an&^that, fact,., that
amount,claimed.by^thej^csp t ond_ent was reduced by a credit, did nc^t,establish that ren
s [^^SS^^^^S^^K^^
& ^ P«ar tyi?£» en^^Jo.
costs.
Judgment affirmed.

D A W S O N T. S H E A E E E
Cite as 337 P.2<3 46
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1. Appeal and Error C=MOIO<l)
F i n d i n g o f a trial court will not be d i s turbed if there is any e v i d e n c e to support
it.

"In this regard w e fully appreciate
the rule that a finding o f the trial Court
will not be disturbed if there is any
e v i d e n c e t o support it. * * * "

2. Contracts <S=>350(I)
In a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r for the b a l a n c e
due on c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a h o u s e , e v i d e n c e
sustained j u d g m e n t for the plaintiffs.

[ 2 ] N o u s e f u l purpose w o u l d be s e r v e d
by a n a r r a t i v e of the e v i d e n c e . It is sufficient to s a y that it w a s sharply in conflict
and that the findings of f a c t arc amply s u p ported by substantial e v i d e n c e .

3. Evidence C=»442(5)
W h e r e c o n t r a c t for c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a
house w a s partly in w r i t i n g and partly oral
and the d o c u m e n t did not incorporate the
complete a g r e e m e n t o f the parties, admitting oral t e s t i m o n y to s h o w the a g r e e m e n t
was proper.
I. Evidence C=>384
T h e parol e v i d e n c e rule is not an e x rlusionary rule o f e v i d e n c e , but one of s u b itantivc law.
5. Coita C=32<5)
F a c t that a m o u n t c l a i m e d by plaintiff
n action for b a l a n c e due o n c o n s t r u c t i o n of
•-

* *

t - *

«

-

-

' .

'

L h o u s e w a s r e d u c e d by credit did not e s a b h s h that plaintiff w a s not the " p r e v a i l i n g *
>arty" and n o t entitled to costs.,. KCVV 4.W.030.
See publication Words ond Fhrnsca,
for other judicial constructions t»i»d defiiiitious of "Prevailing Party".

Zundel, M e r g e s , B r a i n & Isaac, S e a t t l e ,
or a p p e l l a n t s .
Hclscll, Paul, Fettcrman, T o d d & Hokano n , and R i c h a r d S. W h i t e , S e a t t l e , for rcpondent.
F O S T E R , Justice.
Appellants,
defendants
below,
appeal
roiti a j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e m for the balncc due on the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a h o u s e .
[ 1 ] T h e basic dispute is factual and the
videncc is in direct conflict.
In c o n Dnance w i t h our d e c i d e d c a s e s , 1 appelnts' c o u n s e l , in the o p e n i n g brief, f o r t h g h l l y c o n c e d e the applicable rule of l a w :
Kuyntli v. Anderson Constr. Co., Wash.,
.*<24 P 2 d 2G4 ; Fischler v. Nicklin, 51
\Vii8h.2ii 0 1 8 . 319 P.2d 100S ; Croton

[ 3 ] A p p e l l a n t s argue that the parol e v i dence rule w a s violated in admitting oral
testimony to s h o w the a g r e e m e n t .
After
the work w a s finished the parties did s i g n a
contract, but the court found upon o v e r w h e l m i n g e v i d e n c e that t h i s d o c u m e n t "did
not incorporate therein the complete a g r e e ment of the parties." I n d e e d , the appellants' a n s w e r specifically pleaded that the
contract w a s partly in w r i t i n g and partly
oral.
[ 4 ] R e c e n t l y w e r e v i e w e d this a s p e c t
of the so-called parol e v i d e n c e rule in
Barber v. R o c h e s t e r , W a s h . , 328 P.2d 711,
and need not now restate t h e analysis. T h e
name is a m i s n o m e r for it is not an e x c l u sionary rule of e v i d e n c e , but o n e of substantive law.
T h e c o n c l u s i o n there r e a c h e d is found in
the f o l l o w i n g paragraph :
" P e o p l e have the right to make their
a g r e e m e n t s partly oral and partly in
writing, or entirely oral or entirely in
w r i t i n g ; and it is the court's duty to
a s c e r t a i n from all r e l e v a n t , e x t r i n s i c
e v i d e n c e , either oral or w r i t t e n , w h e t h er the entire a g r e e m e n t has been i n c o r porated in the w r i t i n g or not. T h a t is
a question of fact. R i n a u d o v. B l o o m ,
209 Md. 1, 120 A.2d 184; L a w r e n c e
v. T a n d y & Allen, Inc., 14 N.J. 1, 100
A.2d S91 ; Atlantic N o r t h e r n A i r l i n e s
v. S c l . w i m m c r , 12 N.J. 293, 96 A . 2 d
652. * *
V
T h e a s s i g n m e n t is w i t h o u t merit.
T h i s , l i k e w i s e , disposes of the a s s i g n m e n t
that the court erred in r e f u s i n g to require
CIHMIIM-UI Corp. v. TJirkcnwald, 50 Wash.
2d 034, 314 l\2d G22.

~~.

,-
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respondent to elect between the written contract or the oral one.
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The judgment is affirmed.
WEAVER, C. J., and HILL, D O N W O R T H and ROSELLINI, JJ., concur.
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and board appealed. The Supreme Court,
Ott, J., held that where city had no legal
obligation to permit the employee to become eligible for retirement, employee voluntarily assented to conditions upon which
city was willing to permit her to earn pension, and employee fully understood she
would voluntarily leave city # service at
agreed termination date, employee was not
overreached, defrauded, or misled by being permitted to qualify for normal retirement on city's terms.
Reversed with instructions.
Hunter, J., dissented.
f. Municipal Corporations C=220(9)
In action by employee against city for
increased pension on theory that she was
involuntarily separated from employment,
employee had burden of proof to establish
that employment was terminated by involuntary separation.
2. Municipal Corporations <©=>2I7(6)
Fact that employee was ready, able and
willing to work did not obligate city to cmploy her beyond termination day of contract of her employment.
3. Municipal Corporations <£=2I7(6)

Ruth Dodd M O L L E T T , Respondent,
v.
C I T Y O F TACOMA, a municipal corporation,
John H. Anderson, Lyle H. Lemley, C. A.
Galsford, Carl Berglund, Harry Manning,
Eddie Bernard and Les Flfer, the members
of and constituting the Board of Administration of the Tacorn a Employe's Retirement System of the City of Tacoma, Appellants.

No. 34004.
Supreme Court of Washington,
Department 1.
March 19, 1059.
Rehearing Denied June 11, 19T>9.
Action by employee against city and
pension board for increased pension on
theory that she was involuntarily separated
from employment. The Superior Court,
Pierce County, Bcrtil E. Johnson, J., rendered judgment for the employee, and city

Where employment contract between
city and employee specified period of duration of employment, the contract terminated by operation of time alone.
4. Master and Servant <3=>2I
Where prospective employee accepts
employment contract containing fixed terminal date, and employer offers no further
employment beyond the terminal date, employee cannot be heard to say when terminal date arrives, that severance from his
employment was involuntary or that his
employer breached termination provisions
of contract.
5. Municipal Corporations <§=>220(9)
Where city had no legal obligation to
permit employee to become eligible for retirement, employee voluntarily assented to
conditions upon which city was willing to
permit her to earn pension, and employee
fully understood she would voluntarily

Cite na 33*! P.2d 48

c a v e city s e r v i c e at a g r e e d t e r m i n a t i o n
date, e m p l o y e e w a s not o v e r r e a c h e d , defrauded, or misled by being permitted to
qualify for n o r m a l ' retirement on city's
terms.
6. Municipal Corporations <5==220(9)
In action by e m p l o y e e against city for
i n c r e a s e d pension o n t h e o r y that she w a s
i n v o l u n t a r i l y separated from e m p l o y m e n t ,
e v i d e n c e preponderated against trial court's
finding that e m p l o y e e w a s i n v o l u n t a r i l y
separated from city s e r v i c e .

Marshall M c C o r m i c k , Robert R. H a m i l ton and Allan R. liillett, T a c o m a , for appellants.
E . K Murray, E . M. Murray, T a c o m a ,
for respondent.
O T T , Justice.
S e p t e m b e r 8, 1950, Ruth D o d d Mollett
voluntarily r e s i g n e d her e m p l o y m e n t with
the city of T a c o m a . S h e had been a m e m ber of the T a c o m a retirement s y s t e m nine
years, eight m o n t h s , and eight days, and
had paid into the retirement fund the sum
of $1,847.24, w h i c h w a s r e f u n d e d to her
upon her r e s i g n a t i o n , as provided by t h e
pension o r d i n a n c e .
In 1955, M r s . Mollett made application
to the city for e m p l o y m e n t , "In order to e s tablish [ h e r ] p e n s i o n rights." B e c a u s e o f
problems i n v o l v i n g civil service eligibility
lists, she w a s notified in w r i t i n g that her
application for e m p l o y m e n t had been accepted on a t e m p o r a r y basis and that she
would be e m p l o y e d by the city for a term
c o m m e n c i n g S e p t e m b e r 7, 1955, and terminating D e c e m b e r 9, 1955. E a t r r , she w a s
g i v e n written n o t i c e of, and she accepted,
further limited term e m p l o y m e n t appointments, as f o l l o w s :
from D e c e m b e r 12,
1955, to M a r c h 9, 1956; from M a r c h 10,
1956, to S e p t e m b e r 9, 1956; and from S e p tember 10, 1956, to October 31, 1956.
Mrs. Mollett redeposited in the retirement fund, as a u t h o r i z e d by the ordinance,
the amount of her former w i t h d r a w a l , $ 1 , 847.24, and d u r i n g the four limited term
337 P.2d

4

e m p l o y m e n t periods, pension
deductions
w e r e made from her salary and deposited
in the p e n s i o n fund.
S u b s e q u e n t to O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1956, the termination date o f her last limited term appointment, Mrs. Mollett w a s notified that
she had been g r a n t e d a normal p e n s i o n in
the sum of $40.91 a month, in c o n f o r m i t y
with the v o l u n t a r y retirement p r o v i s i o n s ,
§§ 1 3 ( b ) and 1 4 ( a ) , of o r d i n a n c e N o . 14039,
as a m e n d e d .
Mrs. Mollett instituted this action against
the city of T a c o m a and the pension board
for an increased pension, c o n t e n d i n g that
she w a s inz'oluntarily
separated
from her
e m p l o y m e n t and that she w a s entitled to a
m i n i m u m pension of $85 a m o n t h , as provided by § 1 4 ( c ) of ordinance N o . 14039,
as amended.
F r o m a j u d g m e n t s u s t a i n i n g her c o n t e n tion, the city and the pension board have
appealed.
T h e city will be referred to
herein as t h o u g h it w e r e the sole appellant.
T h e appeal presents a s i n g l e query ; W a s
respondent's retirement a c c o m p l i s h e d by
an involuntary separation from city service
employment ?
S e c t i o n 1 4 ( c ) o f o r d i n a n c e N o . 14039,
as a m e n d e d , is in part as f o l l o w s :
" A n y member w h o entered the Retirement S y s t e m on January 1, 1941,
* * * tvlio shall have been or shall
be retired by reason of an
inz'ohtntary
permanent
separation
f r o m city service, and * * * has r e a c h e d the a g e
of fifty-seven ( 5 7 ) y e a r s and has to
his credit at least ten ( 1 0 ) years of
creditable s e r v i c e , shall r e c e i v e
* *
not less that $85.00 per m o n t h . * * "
(Italics ours.)
W e b s t e r ' s International D i c t i o n a r y defines
" i n v o l u n t a r y " as " N o t proceeding
from choice ; done, g i v e n , etc., u n w i l l i n g ly or under c o m p u l s i o n ; * * * ".
S e c t i o n 1 3 ( b ) , as a m e n d e d , p r o v i d e s :
" 'Any member in the city service
m a y retire by filing w i t h the Board a
w r i t t e n application s t a t i n g w h e n he des i r e s to be retired, such application to
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trial briefing, and involved a significant
number of difficult and complex legal issues. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Northern attorney's fees above
those called for under the schedule of Rule
82.
Affirmed.

O

* n o NUMBIR SYSTEM

STATE of Alaska, Appellant,
v.
ALASKA INTERNATIONAL AIR,
INC., Appellee.
No. 2808.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
April 13, 1977.
Alaska filed civil complaint requesting
liquidated damages for oil spills. Following
State's voluntary dismissal of its action,
upon motion of defendant, the Superior
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Gerald J.
Van Hoormssen, J., granted attorney fees to
defendant, and State appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that actions of
defendant concerning discovery motions
and its "sparse" motion to dismiss did not
serve to join issue before court and thus
plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, prior to .answer or a motion for summary judgment or
any other pleading or motion requiring consideration of merits, terminated the action
so that no "prevailing party" could emerge
to receive an award of attorney fees under
rule.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Costs <*=~172
The "prevailing party," within rule authorizing the award of attorney fees to
prevailing party, is one who is successful on

the main issue in a case. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 82.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Appeal and Error «=*984(1, 5)
Costs <*=>172
The power to award costs and attorney
fees lies within the discretion of the trial
courts and will not be interfered with unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 82.
3. Costs <*=»172
Actions of defendant concerning discovery motions and its "sparse" motion to
dismiss did not serve to join issue before
court and thus plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, prior to answer or a motion for summary
judgment or any other pleading or motion
requiring consideration of merits, terminated the action so that no "prevailing party"
could emerge to receive an award of attorney fees under rule. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 41(aXl)[a], 77(b)(2), 82(a).

Jonathan K. Tillinghast, Asst. Alty. Gen.,
Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for
appellant.
OPINION
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RARINOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE,
JJ.
BURKE, Justice.
This action comes to us on appeal from a
lower court order awarding attorney's fees
to appellee, Alaska International Air, after
appellant, State of Alaska, dismissed its
case pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Alaska Rules
of Civil Procedure. It should be noted that
appellee filed no brief in response to the
State's appeal.
CQH nfcPOTikroflrtplain«ifmflg»8n' p*rHor*^TOH
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i ^ a w ^ K < M P " t ^ h r ^ w R < r ^ M < i n w n * AIA filed
neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment. The appellant on December
1, 1975 noticed a voluntary dismissal of its
action
without prejudice under
Rule
41(aXl), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.*
Subsequent to that notice, and upon AlA's
motion, the lower court granted AIA
$3,500.00 in attorney's fees
This appeal
was taken from that award.
Contemporaneous with the filing of its
complaint, appellant served upon AIA an
initial set of interrogatories, requests for
admission and requests for production of
documents. The entire discovery request
consumed less than five pages, and focused
on such threshold matters as admissions of
liability, identity of witnesses and the like.
For a period of almost six months, AIA
neither complied with the discovery re1.

A S 46.03 760 p r o v i d e s in p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
Pollution penalties,
(a) A p e r s o n w h o violates
§§ 710, 7 3 0 . 740. or 750 of this c h a p t e r is fcuilty
of a m i s d e m e a n o r a n d upon c o n v i c t i o n is puni s h a b l e by a fine of not m o r e t h a n $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 . or
by i m p r i s o n m e n t for not m o r e t h a n o n e y e a r .
or by both
E a c h unlawful act c o n s t i t u t e s a
s e p a r a t e offense
(b) !n a d d i t i o n to the p e n a t t i e s p r o v i d e d »n
( a ) of this s e c t i o n a p e r s o n w h o v i o l a t e s
§§ 7 4 0 - 7 5 0 of t h i s c h a p t e r is liable, in a civil
a c t i o n , to t h e s t a t e for liquidated d a m a g e s to be
a s s e s s e d by t h e c o u r t for an a m o u n t not less
t h a n S5.000 nor m o r e t h a n $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . d e p e n d i n g
o n t h e s e v e n t y of t h e violation.

2.

R u l e 41(a)(1). A l a s k a Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e
p r o v i d e s in p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
S u b j e c t to t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 23(c). of
Rule 66 a n d of a n y s t a t u t e of t h e s t a t e , an
a c t i o n m a y be d i s m i s s e d by t h e plaintiff witho u t o r d e r of c o u r t (u) by filing a notice of
d i s m i s s a l at a n y l i m e befure s e r v i c e by t h e
a d v e r s e p a r t y of an a n s w e r or of a m o t i o n for
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , w h i c h e v e r first o c c u r s
. . U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d in the nolice of d i s m i s s a l
t h e d i s m i s s a l is
without prejudice

3.

Rule 26(c). A l a s k a Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e ,
provides.
(c) Protective
Orders
U p o n m o t i o n by a
p a r t y or by t h e p e r s o n from w h o m d i s c o v e r y
is s o u g h t , a n d for good c a u s e s h o w n , t h e
c o u r t in w h i c h the action ts p e n d i n g or altei n a t i v e l y , on m a t t e r s relating to a d e p o s i t i o n .
t h e c o u r t in t h e judicial d i s t r i c t w h e r e t h e

quests nor sought a protective order under
Civil Rule 2G(c).3
On May 28, 1975, AIA filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted.
The motion was supported by a Vh page
memorandum
The memorandum, which
contained no case authorities, argued, inter
alia, that the complaint should be dismissed
because (1) it alleged the discharge of oil,
when the relevant statute proscribed only
the discharge of petroleum products; (2) it
alleged that AIA "allowed" the discharge of
oil, when ihc statute proscribed only the
"causing or |>ermitting" of the discharge,
and (3) in any event, AS 46.03.760(b) "is
unconstitutional on its face." AIA did not
identify which constitution, nor which provisions thereof, were being violated by the
statute.
On July 1, 1975, appellant, pursuant to
Rule 37(a). Alaska
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure, 4 filed a motion to compel a red e p o s i t i o n is to be t a k e n m a y m a k e any order
w h i c h j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s to p r o t e c t a p a r t y or
p e r s o n from a n n o y a n c e , e m b a r r a s s m e n t , opp r e s s i o n , or u n d u e b u r d e n or e x p e n s e , including one or m o r e of the following ( I ) that t h e
d i s c o v e r y not be had, ( 2 ) t h a t t h e d i s c o v e r y
m a y be had only on specified t e r m s and cond i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g a d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e time or
place; (3) that t h e d i s c o v e r y m a y be had only
by a m e t h o d of d i s c o v e r y o t h e r t h a n that
s e l e c t e d by the p a r t y s e e k i n g d i s c o v e r y . (A)
t h a t c e r t a i n m a t t e r s not be i n q u i r e d into, or
t h a t t h e s c o p e of the d i s c o v e r y be limited to
c e r t a i n m a t t e r s . (5) that d i s c o v e r y be con
d u c t e d w i t h no o n e p r e s e n t e x c e p t p e r s o n s
d e s i g n a t e d by t h e c o u r t . (6) t h a t a d e p o s i t i o n
after b e i n g sealed be o p e n e d o n l y by order of
t h e c o u r t ; (7) that a t r a d e s e c r e t or o t h e r
c o n f i d e n t i a l r e s e a r c h , d e v e l o p m e n t , or com
m e r c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n not be d i s c l o s e d or be
d i s c l o s e d only in a d e s i g n a t e d w a y . (H) that
t h e p a r t i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y file specified doc
u m e n t s or i n f o r m a t i o n e n c l o s e d in sealed en
v e l o p e s to be o p e n e d a s d i r e c t e d by t h e
court
If t h e m o t i o n for a p r o t e c t i v e order is denied in w h o l e or in part, the c o u r t n u > . on
s u c h t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s as a r e just, o r d e r
t h a t a n y p a r t y or p e r s o n p r o v i d e or permit
discovery
T h e p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 37(a)(-1)
a p p l y to t h e a w a r d of e x p e n s e s incurred in
r e l a t i o n t o the m o t i o n
4.

Rule 37(a) p r o v i d e s
(a) Motion
for
Outer
Compelling
Dis
covery.
A p a r t y , upon r e a s o n a b l e notice to
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sponse to its yet unanswered discovery requests, and to award appellant expenses in
bringing the motion.
On September 22,
1975, the lower court granted appellant's
motion to compel discovery and awarded
appellant $500.00 in attorney's fees. The
order, however, required compliance with
the discovery requests by a d a t e which had
already passed—August 29, 1975. On or
about September 25th, the court corrected
its error and served the amended order
upon all counsel the same day. The amended order required compliance by October 10,
1975.
The October 10th deadline expired without compliance by AIA. On October 14,
1975, appellant moved, pursuant to Civil
Rule 37(b)(2)(C), 5 for j u d g m e n t by default
other parties and ail persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate Court. An application for
an order to a party may be made to the court
in which the action is pending, or, on matters
relating to a deposition, to the court in the
judicial district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the
court in the judicial district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a
question propounded or submitted under
Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity
fails to make a designation under Rules
30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33. or
if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34. fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move
for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in
accordance with the request. When taking a
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for
an order
If the court denies the motion in whole or
in part, it may make such protective order as
it would have been empowered to make on a
motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Answer.
For
purposes of this subdivision an evasive or
incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the
motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or
deponent whose conduct necessitated the

for failure to comply with the lower court's
discovery order.
On October 16th, AIA
served upon appellant documents in response to appellant's May 2, 1975 request
for production. On October 23rd, AIA responded to appellant's May 2nd interrogatories and requests for admissions.
AIA opposed the motion for entry of
default j u d g m e n t on the ground that its
failure to comply with the court's order
compelling discovery, and its lack of response to appellant's discovery requests,
were due to excusable neglect. On November 28, 1975, the lower court denied appellant's motion for default j u d g m e n t .
On December 1, 1975, appellant filed a
notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice p u r s u a n t to Civil Rule 41(a)(1). The
motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving
party the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including attorney's fees,
unless the court finds that the opposition to
the motion was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall,
after opportunity for hearing, require the
moving party or the attorney advising the
motion or both of them to pay to the party or
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the
motion, including attorney's fees, unless the
court finds that the making of the motion
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied
in part, the court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just
manner.
5. Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
If a party
fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or
Rule 35. the court in which the action is
pending may make such orders in regard to
the failure as are just, and among others the
following:
(C) An order striking out pleadings or
parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party
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case was dismissed because the passage of
time had made witnesses unavailable. The
alleged oil spills occurred in connection with
construction of the Trans-Alaska pipeline,
and persons involved shared the transient
nature of most pi|>eline personnel, making
production of witnesses difficult.
On December 17, 1975, AIA moved for an
award of attorney fees, contending t h a t it
was the prevailing party under Civil Rule
82(a).* On J a n u a r y 28, 197G, the lower
court awarded AIA $3,500.00 for all legal
work allegedly devoted to the case by Mr.
Cole. The court ruled that, although " t h e
case has never really l>een at issue," nonetheless "there is no question that [AIA] is
the prevailing party."
[1, 2] In Alaska, the basic structure with
respect to the awarding of attorney's fees is
set forth in Civil Rule 82 which provides for
the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
ThlP^III^ViltfW^paVby^hftW1
te»fWH6fiffia*a»KWnH3^
theajnajjiiiMUe^untakcase
Cooper v. Curlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973). The
power to award costs and attorney's fees
lies within the discretion of the trial courts
and will not be interfered with unless there
is a clear abuse of discretion. Adoption of
V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 795 (Alaska 1974).
Given this framework, the state argues,
citing R. A. Davcnny & Associates, Inc. v.
Shinjin Motor Sales Company, Ltd., 533
P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1975), that the lower
6.

Rule 82(a) A l a s k a R u l e s of Civil P r o c e d u r e ,
provides:
(a) Allowance
to Prevailing
Party tis
Costs
(1) U n l e s s t h e c o u r t , in its d i s c r e t i o n , o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t s , t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e d u l e of att o r n e y ' s fees will be a d h e r e d to in fixing s u c h
fees for t h e p a r t y r e c o v e r i n g a n y m o n e y
j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n , as p a r t of t h e c o s t s of t h e
a c t i o n a l l o w e d by law
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S h o u l d n o r e c o v e r y b e h a d . a t t o r n e y ' s fees
for t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y m a y be fixed b y t h e
c o u r t a s a p a r t of t h e c o s t s of t h e a c t i o n , in
its d i s c r e t i o n , in a r e a s o n a b l e a m o u n t .
(2) In a c t i o n s w h e r e t h e m o n e y j u d g m e n t
is not an a c c u r a t e c r i t e r i a for d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

court erred in awarding attorney's fees to
AIA after the state d is missed its case pursuant to Civil Rule 41(aXl). The thrust of
the state's argument is t h a t the mere filing
of the notice of dismissal under the rule
terminates the litigation. This court initially answered such a contention in Miller v.
Wilkes, 496 P.2d 176 (Alaska 1972). Miller
involved a suit wherein the plaintiff alleged
an oral agreement for the sale of an interest in real property. Miller sought and
obtained a temporary order restraining
Wilkes from conveying his interest in the
property. After dissolution of the temporary order, Miller moved for a preliminary
injunction. Hearings were scheduled, frequently continued, and never held. Wilkes
filed a memorandum in opposition to the
preliminary injunction which raised four defenses, and also an affidavit which denied
several factual allegations of the plaintiff.
Subsequently, Miller filed a voluntary dismissal of his suit. Wilkes immediately
moved (or attorney's fees and his motion
was granted. Miller moved for reconsideration but an order was entered awarding
Wilkes $500.00 in attorney's fees.
This court, while noting that there is
authority for the proposition that a notice
of dismissal pursuant
to Civil
Rule
41(aXl)[<i] deprives a court of jurisdiction to
take any further action on a particular matter, 7 held for the broader view that:
The primary purpose of Ruie 41(a)(1) is
to 'allow the plaintiff to dismiss as of
fee to b e a l l o w e d to t h e p r e v a i l i n g s i d e , (he
c o u r t s h a l l a w a r d a fee c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h
t h e a m o u n t a n d v a l u e of legal s e r v i c e s rendered
( 3 ; T h e a l l o w a n c e of a t t o r n e y ' s fees by the
c o u r t in c o n f o r m a n c e w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g
s c h e d u l e is not to be c o n s t r u e d a s fixing the
fees b e t w e e n a t t o r n e y a n d client
7.

496 P 2d at 177. n I, citing
5 J Moore.
Fi-di-ral P r a c t i c e § 4 1 0 2 ( 2 ] . nt 102 1 1022 (2d
ed 197 1). 9 C. W r i g h t a n d A Miller. F e d e r a l
P r a c t i c e a n d P r o c e d u r e § 2 3 6 6 . at 176 177
( ! 9 7 l ) . Miller v Reddin.
422 F 2d 1264 (9th
Cir 1970). Hyde Constr.
Co v Koehrin^
Co.
3 8 8 F 2d 501 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 1968). American
Cyanamid Co. v. McGhce.
3 1 7 F 2d 295 (5th Cir
1963). Bryan v. Smith.
174 F 2d 212 ( 7 t h O r .
1949)
But see White v. Thompson.
80 F S u p p
41 1 (N D.III. 1948)

., ~+* ojc«rvilliv3

right before issue has been joined.
Where issue has been joined by means
other than those specified in Rule 41(aXl)
that purpose dictates t h a t the plaintiffs'
right to dismiss by notice be nonetheless
terminated. Not every action by the defendant cuts off the plaintiff's right;
only those actions which would require
the court to consider the merits of the
controversy or which involve considerable
expense and effort on the part of the
defendant suffice. 496 P.2d at 177-78.
(footnotes omitted, emphasis in original)

Shinjin filed objections to the notice o{
missal. The superior court, after a heat
denied the plaintiff's Civil Rule 41(a)(i
dismissal. The superior court's decision £
predicated on the grounds that the plair{
had waived its right to a voluntary disn|
al under Civil Rule 41(a)(l)[a] by virtu?
the stipulation which it had entered t
with the defendant.

After holding that a stipulation extei
ing time does not waive a plaintiff's rig
to dismiss an action pursuant to Civil Rt
41(aXl)[a], 533 P.2d at 1114, this court fu
In R. A. Davenny & Assoc., Inc. v. Shinjin
ther refined the Miller v. Wilkes rule [
Motor Sales Company, Ltd., 533 P.2d 1112
stating:
(Alaska 1975) we were again called upon to
[t]he dicta in Miller regarding 'actior
decide the applicability of Civil Rule
which involve considerable expense an;;
41(aXl) as a cut off mechanism to a civil
effort on the part of defendant' was nq
action. In Shinjin, the plaintiff, R. A. Daessential to support the result in Milled
venny, instituted an action on October 23,
and is hereby disapproved.
(footnote
1974 against the defendant, Shinjin alleging
omitted)
t h a t Shinjin had wrongfully failed to file a
Given these guidelines, the question \i
termination s t a t e m e n t pursuant to a securiwhether the issue in this particular litiga-!
8
ty agreement.
On November 12, Wanation was joined. 9 In beginning our analysis
maker and DeVcaux entered an appearance
we must look to the actions of appellee to
as attorneys for Shinjin, and, on this same
ascertain if its efforts rose to the functional
date, the plaintiff agreed to allow the deequivalent of an answer. After review of;
fendant until December 19, 1974 to answer
the record, we can find no action that
the complaint. Thereafter, on November
would rise to the Miller-Davenny standard \
18, 1974, Shinjin filed a notice that the
and serve to join the issue before the court. *,
deposition of R. A. Davenny would be taken
AIA's motion to dismiss is so sparse as to :
on December 4, 1974. On December 2, 1974
prove
frivolous. Civil Rule 77(bX2) states: •
Shinjin's counsel declined to stipulate to a
(b) There shall be served and filed with '
postponement of Davenny's deposition.
the motion:
\
The following day Davenny filed a notice of
•
*
•
*
*
*
dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 41(a)(l)[a].
After this notice had been filed, Shinjin,
(2) A brief, complete written statelater that same afternoon, filed an answer
ment ot the reasons in support of the
to Davenny's complaint. On December 4,
motion, which shall include a memoran8.

9.

AS 45.05.774(a) of Alaska's Uniform Commercial Code—Secured Transactions provides
in part:
If there is no outstanding secured obligation and no commitment to make advances,
incur obligations, or otherwise give value, the
secured party must, on written demand by
the debtor, send the debtor a statement that
he no longer claims a security interest under
the financing statement, which shall be identified by file number.

In Miller, 496 P 2d 176. 178, this court stated
in finding the facts sufficient for joinder of the
Issue that

A motion for a preliminary injunction puts
the merits of the controversy in issue: in
considering the motion the trial court would
have to determine the likelihood of success
The memorandum and affidavit together
serve as an 'answer' to the motion for a
preliminary injunction. As such, they are
tantamount to an 'answer' for purposes of
Rule 41(a)(1) and should terminate the plaintiffs right to dismiss the action by notice.
The trial court could therefore properly have
considered the notice as a motion for dismissal and was within its powers in awarding costs. (footnote omitted) 496 P.2d at
178.
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dum of the points and authorities upon
which the moving party will rely;
In support of its motion to dismiss for failure to stale a claim on which relief could be
granted, AIA filed in support thereof a IV2
page memorandum.
This memorandum
was devoid of any authorities and merely
raised three somewhat dubious issues:
1. The semantic point that the complaint only alleged that appellee "allowed"
the discharge of oil, when the statute proscribed "causing or permitting" of discharge:
2. The fact that the complaint alleged
the discharge of "oil," when the statute
proscribed only the discharge of "petroleum
products;" and
3. The unsupported statement that "AS
46.03.700(b) is unconstitutional on its face."
[3] With the plaintiff's utilization of the
cutoff mechanism embodied in Civil Rule
41(aXl)[a], prior to service of an answer, a
motion for summary judgment, or any oth-

cr pleading or motion that would have required the trial court to consider the merits
of the controversy, the action was terminated. R. A. Davenny & Assoc, Inc. v. Shinjin
Motor Sales Company, Ltd., 533 P.2d 1112,
1115 (Alaska 1975); Miller v. Wilkes, 49G
P.2d 176, 177 (Alaska 1972). Without a
joinder of issue no controversy developed
out of which a prevailing party could
emerge. See Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d
1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973). The lack of a
prevailing party therefore precludes an
award of attorney's fees under Civil Rule
82(a). Consequently, we hold that the lower court erred in awarding AIA attorney's
fees. We reverse the judgment l>elow and
remand for entry of zero attorney's fees
REVERSED and REMANDED

When recorded return to:
Verden E. Bettilyon
Woodbury Bettilyon and Kesler
2677 East Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT
The undersigned, ASSOCIATED TITLE CO., Tiustee, hereby gives Notice
of Default and of" the exorcise of its election to declare all sums secured
by the Trust Deed hereinafter described to be immediately due and payable.
This notice relates to a Trust Deed executed by, DANIEL S. MEHR &
KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II K DEBORAH L. MEHR as Trustor, ASSOCIATED
TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP., as
Beneficiary, dated January 2 8 , 1983, recorded February 2, 1983, in Bock 325
at Page 133, as Document No. 199115 of the records of the Uintah, County
Recorder, covering the following described property to-wit:
PARCEL I
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner of
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; thence West 125
feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, and being within the
unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah.
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter comer
cf
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; thence North 70
feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East line of the
Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter section of said section; thence
South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to the East property
line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith II. Robbins as acquired by Warranty
Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 127337, in Book 172, at Page
112 of official records, thence North 55 feet; thence West 105 feet to the
place of beginning, and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City,
Uintah County, Utah.
Parcel 2
"Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of
the Southeast, quarter, Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East. Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 feet; thence South 3
rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or less to the 1/16th line;
thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of beginning.
ALSO: Lots 21, 22 and 23 of the proposed CENTRAL PART, PLAT "A", a
subdivision located in Section 26 Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, in Uintah County, Utah.
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This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK .formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A.
A breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as
security, has occurred consisting of the following:
Payments for
January through July, 1905, for a total delinquency of $83,128.24, are due
and payable. Said breach can be cured by payment of said sum, plus
additional payments and interest that may accrue hereafter.
In the event of your -failure to cure said breach within ninety days
after the recording of tin's Notice of D e f a u l t , the Beneficiary shall and
Joes hereby elect to exeiciso its option to declare all sums secured by theTrust Deed above described to be immediately due and payable without
further notice to you. At the end o1 said ninety day period the Trustee
elects to sell or cause to he sold such property to satisfy the obligation
due under the note.
You are further advised of your right to bring a court action to
assert the non-existence of a default or any otlier defense you may have to
the acceleration and sale of the property.
By reason of such default, OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING and LOAN ASSOCIATION', F.A., the present
beneficiary under said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to Trustee a
written Declaration of Default and demand for sale and has deposited with
said Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing obligations
secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured
thereby immediately due and payable, ano has elected arc does hereby elect
to cause the trust properties to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured
thereby.
bATED this 6th day of September, 1985,

Verden E. Bettilyon
Attorney for Trustee

STATE OF Utah

)

COUNTY OF Salt Lake

)

ss.

'.','Divthe 6th day of September, 1985, personally appeared before me,
,v S
/\\y^r4xr})
E.; B e t t i l y o n , Attorney at Law, the signer of the foregoing
•./ •'''ih'Hruii^nt, who duly acknowledge to me t h a t he executed the same.

'S \ ' 'My>'pQmpii ^sion Expi res : 5-18-89
V \ 'Residing'* t\i B o u n t i f u l , Utah
n.
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Notary Public
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